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Dawn Russell* Paedophilia: The Criminal
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Churches
I. Introduction
In the last few years Canada's churches have been plagued by sexual
abuse scandals from Newfoundland to British Columbia. Members of the
clergy and of lay orders across the country have been charged with, and
convicted of, criminal offences involving the physical and sexual abuse
of children. Mediareports and television documentaries have emphasized
the tremendous scope of the problem of clergy paedophilia, the seriousness
of the harm done to the victims, and the irresponsible and sometimes
heartless behaviour of church officials who received reports of such
abuse. These stories have shocked the Canadian public and have given
rise to a sense of crisis to which the law and society must respond. The
purpose of this article is to explore the question of whether churches and
religious organizations should be held criminally responsible for the acts
and omissions of senior clerics who, in response to reports of clergy
paedophilia, engage in organizational behaviour which is designed to
protect the abuser and to promote the interests of the church or organization
concerned, at the expense of past and future victims.
In exploring this issue, this article first considers some of the similarities
and differences between churches and business corporations from an
organizational perspective. This article applies a corporatist model to the
issue of the criminal responsibility of Canada's churches. In doing so it
examines the theoretical basis for the criminal responsibility of business
corporations in Canada today and the criticisms that have been made of
corporate criminal responsibility. The policy reasons underlying the
corporate responsibility of churches for the acts of their agents, and the
circumstances in which it would be appropriate to impose corporate
liability on churches and church organizations are explored. The
development of criminal sanctions especially designed to target the
non-financial motivations of churches is considered. Finally, several
provisions of Canada's criminal law are examined with a view to their
potential application to the acts and omissions of senior clerics and
church officials who fail to take reasonable steps in order to stop existing
sexual and physical abuse of children by clergy under their control. The
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purpose of considering these provisions is not to provide an exhaustive
legal analysis, but is only to demonstrate that the prosecution of churches
in respect of acts of clergy paedophilia is at least plausible.
1. The Scope of The Problem
On May 1, 1991 Stephen Rooney, a former member of the Roman
Catholic lay order known as the Christian Brothers of Ireland, was found
guilty of sexually abusing two young boys at the Mount Cashel Orphanage
in St. John's, Newfoundland, more than ten years earlier.' Mr. Rooney
was the first of eight current or former Christian Brothers from the Mount
Cashel Orphanage to go on trial following the re-opening, in 1989, of an
earlier police investigation into complaints of physical and sexual abuse
of young boys at the hands of members of the lay order.2 On May 18, 1991
a second member of the Christian Brothers was convicted of sex-related
offences against young boys during his years as a teacher at the Mount
Cashel Orphanage in the early 1970s.3
The Mount Cashel scandal dominated local news programs in
Newfoundland and was a popular topic of open-line radio shows and
letters to the editors of local newspapers for months. As well, it received
extensive national media coverage. However, the sexual abuse scandal
which has gripped the Roman Catholic Church in Newfoundland reaches
far beyond the walls of Mount Cashel. The eight Christian brothers who
were charged in connection with the abuse at Mount Cashel were among
18 priests, brothers and other members of the Catholic community in
Newfoundland charged or convicted of sexually abusing young boys 4 In
1988, one of St. John's most popular priests, fifty-five year-old James
Hickey, was convicted of twenty counts of gross indecency and sexual
assault committed mainly against altar boys over a seventeen-year
period. In January, 1989, another Newfoundland priest, John Corrigan,
fifty-seven, was sentenced to five years in prison for assaulting altar boys
over a period of seven years.5
The sexual abuse scandal facing the Roman Catholic Church in
Canada is not limited to Newfoundland. Similar charges of sexual abuse
of children by Catholic clergy have occurred recently in other provinces.
1. "Former Brother convicted in Mount Cashel abuse case", The Globe andMail, May 2,1991,
at A4.
2. Ibid.
3. "Jury convicts ex-Cashel teacher", The Globe and Mail, May 18, 1991, at A5.
4. N. Underwood and R. Wangersky, "Scandal on the Rock", Maclean's, February, 1989, at
61.
5. Ibid.
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In May 1989, Harold McIntee, a fifty-eight year old Oblate priest from
Williams Lake, British Columbia, pled guilty to seventeen charges of
sexually assaulting young boys at Catholic schools or parishes over a
thirty-year period.6
In whathas now become the largest sex-abuse investigation in Canadian
history, Ontario Provincial Police have laid at least 182 charges against
a total of 25 ex-employees of two reform schools run by the Roman
Catholic lay order, the Brothers of the Christian Schools.7 The charges,
which involve indecent assault, gross indecency and buggery, as well as
82 counts of assault causing bodily harm, are alleged to have occurred at
the St. John's School for Boys at Uxbridge, north of Toronto, between
1957 and 1967, and at the now-closed St. Joseph's Training School in
Alfred, east of Ottawa, between 1941 and 1971.8
In June 1991, R.C.M.P. in Cape Breton, Nova Scotia, charged three
Roman Catholic priests with a series of sexual offenses against males
between 1965 and 1990. The 30 charges included 23 of indecent assault,
4 of sexual assault and 3 of obstruction of justice.9
The sexual abuse scandal that has struck the Catholic Church in
Canada is not the first of its kind to hit the church in North America. In
1985, Louisiana priest Gilbert Gauthe was convicted on 11 counts of
sexually abusing children.10 While Gauthe's case was widely publicized,
it was only one of twenty-one similar cases in Gauthe's diocese."1 In May
1986, a forty-one year old American priest who served as a Boy Scout
leader confessed to raping or sodomizing at least thirty-seven children. 12
The list goes on.' 3
6. D. Roberts, "B.C. bishop chargedwith sex offenses", The Globe andMail, February 5,1991,
at A4.
7. T. Appleby, "Further charges laid by OPP in Christian Brothers case", The Globe andMail,
April 19, 1991, at A8.
8. Ibid.
9. The Canadian Press, "More charges possible - R.C.M.P.", The Chronicle Herald, June 25,
1991, at 1. There are now convictions and at least one sentence handed down. See The
Chronicle-Herald, June 25, 1992, A-15 and The Mail-Star, November 4, 1992, C-16.
10. "Priest's Child - Molestation Case Traumatizes Catholic Community", Washington Post,
June 9, 1985, at A6.
11. G. W. Taylor, "Sins of the Flesh", Maclean's, July 17, 1989, at 11.
12. "Roman Catholic Church Discusses Abuse of Children by Priests", New York Times, May
4, 1986, §1, at 26.
13. For further instances of convictions of Catholic priests on sexual abuse charges in the
United States see R. C. O'Brien, "Paedophilia: The Legal Predicament of Clergy", (1988), 4
Journal of Contemporary HealthLaw andPolicy 91. See also "UnholyAlliances", VanityFair,
December 1991,224, which provides details of the case of Father Cinel, described as the largest
documented case of priest paedophilia in the history of the crime.
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Instances of clergy being arrested for acts of paedophilia 4 are certainly
not limited to the Roman Catholic Church. However, it is the Roman
Catholic Church in Canada which has been hardest hit by sexual abuse
scandals in recent years. All of these cases can be seen as evidence of the
widespread problem of sexual abuse throughout North America. 5
However, the cases involving the clergy seem especially shocking
because of the positions of trust and respect which they occupy and their
avowed personal commitment to eshew even thinking about such crimes.
2. Current Legal Responses to The Problem
The legal system offers both civil and criminal responses to behaviour
which society deems unacceptable. In recent years the Canadian legal
system has responded to instances of physical, emotional and sexual
abuse of children with more extensive reporting requirements for various
professionals involved with children. For instance, section 72(1) of the
Ontario Child and Family ServicesAct 16 requires every "person" who has
reasonable grounds to suspect that a child is or may be suffering abuse to
report the suspicion and the information on which it is based to the child
welfare authorities in Ontario. Subsections 72(3) and 72(4) of the Act
impose the same duty on every person who performs professional or
14. For purposes of this article I have adopted the definition of paedophilia developed by Dr.
Fred S. Berlin, M.D., Ph.D. He is Associate Professor, School of Medicine, John Hopkins
University Baltimore, Md. He is also Co-Director of the John Hopkins Hospital Sexual
Disorders Clinic and a member of the American College of Forensic Psychiatry. In Berlin, "Sex
Offenders: A Biomedical Perspective and a Status Report on Biomedical Treatment", in The
Sexual Aggressor, Current Perspectives on Treatment 83, 86-87 (1983), Berlin defines
paedophilia as follows:
... the term paedophilia will be used when referring to persons sexually oriented towards
children, regardless ofwhether the children are pre-orpost-pubertal ... [This definition includes
three elements:] First, it is necessary to establish that the patient becomes erotically excited
by the act or fantasy of engaging in sexual activities with children. Secondly, if the patient is
an adult, rather than an adolescent, the children must be at least ten years his junior. Finally,
it must be clear that any sexual acts engaged in with children are not either due to other mental
disorders such as schizophrenia, dementia or drug intoxication, or due to the lack of a suitable
age-appropriate partner, which occurs in some cases of incarceration or incest.
15. In 1984, the Canadian National Population Survey reported that 53.5% of females and
22.3% of males reported being abused at some time in their lives. Four-fifths of the victims
were children and youths. The reported abuses included all types of contact and non-contact
abuse, from exposure to sexual assault. The figures are high but they include not only abuse
of children by adults, but also by peers. See Robert F. Badgley (Chairman), Sexual Offences
Against Children, Report of the Committee on Sexual Offences Against Children and Youths,
(Vols. I and 2) (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1984), Vol. 1, at 180.
16. R.S.O. 1990, c. C-11.
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official duties with respect to a child, including inter alia, health care
professionals, teachers, school principals, social workers, family
counsellors, priests, rabbis and clergy, operators and employees of day
nurseries, and solicitors. The definition of abuse in the Act is very broad.
It includes physical and emotional harm and sexual molestation and
exploitation. 17 The duty to report applies even though the information
reported is confidential or privileged.18 The obligation to report is
reinforced by the creation of a penal offence for failure to report. In the
Ontario Act penal sanctions are reserved for those classes of professionals
and officials mentioned in subsection 72(3) of the Act. Under the Act such
professionals who breach the duty to report may be found guilty of an
offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine of not more than
$1000 or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 1 year or to both. 19
Every other province of Canada has enacted similar, though not identical,
legislation 0 In all of the other provinces, with the exception of New
Brunswick, 1 the penal offence applies to any person who fails to report.
As to who must be reported, the Ontario Act relates the reporting
requirements in s. 72 back to the concept of"a child in need of protection"
in s. 37(2). Section 37(2) discusses a child in need of protection in terms
of a child who suffers harm due to the acts or omissions of a parent or
"person having charge of the child." The case law has interpreted the
words "person having charge of the child" broadly, so as not to limit their
application to a parental context.' Thus the words have been held to apply
to abuse of a child by a day care supervisor' or older brother.24 Section
25 of the Nova Scotia Acz  makes it clear that the reporting requirement
applies to abuse of the child by any person, whether or not they are in
17. Ibid., s. 37(2).
18. Ibid., s. 72(7).
19. Ibid., s. 85(1)(b).
20. Children and Family ServicesAct, S.N.S. 1990, c. 5, s. 25; Family and Child Services Act,
R.S.P.E.I., c. F-2, s. 7; The Youth Protection Act, R.S.Q. 1977, c. P-34.1, s. 39; Child Welfare
Act, R.O.N.W.T. 1974, c. C-3, s. 30.1; Child and Family Services Act, S.S. 1989, c. C-7.2, s.
12; Child Welfare Act, S.A. 1984, c. C-8.1, s. 3; Family and Child ServicesAct, S. B.C. 1980,
c. 1I, s. 7; Child and Family Services Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. C-80, s. 18; Family Services Act,
S.N.B. 1980, c. F-2.2, s. 30; and The Child Welfare Act, 1972, S. Nfld. 1972, Act No. 37, s. 49.
21. Family Services Act, S.N.B. 1980, c. F-22, s. 30(3).
22. R. v. Kates, [1987] W.D.F.L. 1840 (Ont. Co. Ct.).
23. Ibid.
24. R. v. Stachula (1984), 40 R.F.L. (2d) 184 (Ont. Prov. Ct. (Fam. Div.)).
25. Children and Family Services Act, S.N.S. 1990, c. 5.
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charge of the child. Most Canadian reporting provisions are capable of an
interpretation at least as broad as that found in the Ontario Act and thus
do not limit the reporting requirement to abuse of a child by a parent or
guardian.2 6 Only Saskatchewan 27 and Alberta" expressly define the need
for protection from abuse in purely parental terms. Such legislative
provisions are evidence of the seriousness with which physical, emotional
and sexual abuse of children is regarded in Canada today.
The Canadian legal system has also responded to instances of abuse of
children through the criminal prosecution of those individuals who are
alleged to have committed the abusive acts. The charges and convictions
mentioned at the beginning of this article, almost all of which relate to acts
of paedophilia committed by members of the clergy, are examples of the
enforcement of Canada's criminal laws against the individual abusers.
In the United States there have also been a number of tort actions
against America's churches and against individual religious leaders or
bishops, in which victims of sexual abuse have sought to have liability
imposed upon churches or religious leaders for acts of sexual molestation
committed by their agents and subordinates, respectively. 9 Where the
tort action has been based on the concept of respondeat superior, so that
liability depends entirely on the attribution of the acts of the agent to the
church principal, churches have escaped liability because acts of sexual
26. Supra, note 20, Nfld., s. 49(l) ("abandonment, desertion, physical ill treatment or need for
protection of a child", with the latter defined ins. 1 (a.1) using the word "person" or no parental
reference at all); P.E.I., s. 14(1) ("a child has been abandoned, deserted or abused", with
"abuse" defined in s. 1 (1)(a) as abuse by "a person responsible for his care and well-being");
N.B., s. 30(l) ("a child has been abandoned, deserted, physically or emotionally neglected,
physically or sexually illtreated or otherwise abused"); N.W.T., s. 30.1(2) ("the abandonment,
desertion or need of protection or the infliction of abuse upon a child", with "abuse" defined
in neutral language in subs. (1) and "need for protection" defined in s. 14(1) in terms of a
"person in whose charge [the childlis"); Man. s. 18(1) ("a child may be in need ofprotection",
defined in s. 17 in non-parental terms, sometimes as "in the care of a person", also used in the
definition of"abuse" respecting s. 17(c) found in s.1 "abuse"); B.C. s. 7(1) ("a child is in need
of protection", defined in s. I "in need of protection" in non-parental terms, except for ground
(c)).
27. Supra, note 20, Sask., s. 12(1) ("a child is in need of protection", which is tied in s. 11 to
"action or omission by a child's parent").
28. Supra, note 20, Alta., s. 3(l) ("a child is in needof protective services", defined in s. 1(2)
exclusively in terms of the guardian of the child).
29. See, for instance, Alma W. v. Oakland Unified School District, 123 Cal. App. 3d 133, 142,
176 Cal Rptr. 287,289 (1981); Milla v. Tamayo, 232 Cal Rptr. 685,187 Cal. App. 3d 1457 (Cal
App. 2d Dist. 1987); Jeffrey Scott E. v. Central Baptist Church, 243 Cal. Rptr. 128, 197 Cal.
App. 3d 718 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 1988); Magnuson v. O'Dea, 75 Wash. 574, 135 P. 640 (1913);
Carini v. Beaven, 219 Mass. 117, 106 N.E. 589 (1914).
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abuse are viewed as not being within the scope of the agent's employment.30
Likewise, tort actions against religious leaders and bishops, based on the
wrongdoings of priests or agents -under their supervision, have failed
where it could not be shown that the leader or bishop approved of or
ratified the acts of their subordinates.3 Nevertheless, Catholic church
officials in the United States and the church's insurers, in unreported jury
awards and confidential settlements, have paid out more than $300
million since 1985 in cases of priests abusing children and adolescents.3 2
In Canada, Shane Earl commenced the first civil suit against several
members of the Christian Brothers of Ireland and the Roman Catholic
Church in connection with abuse he suffered at Mount Cashel.33 Gregory
Connors, another victim of abuse at Mount Cashel has commenced a
similar suit against the Christian Brothers, four brothers or former
brothers and a former lay worker at the orphanage.34 Whether such suits,
especially as they relate to the order or church, will succeed remains to be
seen. However, the recommendations of a Church inquiry into sexual
abuse by members of Newfoundland's Roman Catholic clergy, which
were released on July 18, 1990, included a recommendation that the
Church compensate victims through a fund established by the Church but
run by community members at arm's length from the Church.35
What has not been attempted or done in either Canada or the United
States is to criminally prosecute churches and religious organizations, or
individuals in positions of authority within the hierarchical structures of
30. For an interesting discussion of the obstacles which such suits have encountered in the
United States see S. D. Young, "Sexual Molestation Within America's Parishes and
Congregations: Should The Church Be 'Thy Priest's Keeper'?" (1989), 91 West VirginiaLaw
Review 1097. See also, A. Jackson, "Exclusion of Diocesan Liability For Negligence of Parish
Priest: Bullhart v. Sheier, 243 Kan. 591, 758 P. 2d 219 (1988)" (1989), 58 Cincinnati Law
Review 323; W.W. Bassett, "Religion and Religious Institutions: The Rising Din of
Litigation" (1986), 20 Univ. of San Francisco Law Review 775; and D. Frohlich, "Will Courts
Make Change for a Large Denomination?: Problems of Interpretation in an Agency Analysis
in Which a Religious Denomination Is Involved in an Ascending Liability Tort Case" (1987),
72 Iowa Law Review 1377.
31. S.D. Young, Ibid., at 1110-1111.
32."Unholy Alliances", Vanity Fair, December 1991, 224, at 227. See also Nat'l. Cath. Rep.,
May 30, 1986, at 15 col. 2 in which it was reported that in Lafayette, Louisiana, there was a
$6.75 million damage settlement and that "Two civil grievances involving one priest in a
midwestem diocese were recently settled for approximately $600,000 and an Idaho case was
settled for $25,000."
33. Supra, note 11, at 11.
34. The Canadian Press, "Man suing over allegedMount Cashel abuse", The Chronicle-Herald,
November 29, 1989, at A4.
35. The Report of the Archdiocesan Commission of Enquiry into the Sexual Abuse of Children
by Members of the Clergy, Vols. L-Ill submitted to the Most Reverend Alphonsus L. Penney,
D.D., Archbishop ofSt. John's, June 1990 (hereinafterreferred to as the "WinterReport"), Vol.
I, at 140.
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churches and religious organizations, in connection with acts of sexual or
physical abuse committed by members of the clergy and of lay orders.
This is so even though the evidence clearly suggests that in some cases
further acts of abuse could have been prevented had a senior cleric, to
whom the occurrence of abuse was reported, not ignored the report, or had
such cleric acted in a manner designed to protect present and future
victims rather than the abuser orthe reputation of thereligious organization
itself. For instance, in the Mount Cashel case, one Christian Brother was
ordered out of the orphanage by the superintendent of the Christian
Brothers in Newfoundland, Superintendent Baron, following complaints
that the brother was sexually molesting boys in 1970. The brother left the
orphanage to teach at a local school in St. John's where he led the school's
Boy Scout troop for two years. He then returned to Mount Cashel
following a change in the superintendent of the order.36 There was no
formal internal investigationby SuperintendentBaron into the allegations
of sexual abuse by the brother, no report of the allegations to Newfound-
land social service authorities, and no counselling or treatment provided
to the alleged abuser or to the victims.
In Newfoundland, a commission was appointed by Archbishop Penney
of St. John's Catholic Archdiocese to enquire into sexual abuse by
Catholic priests and brothers in the Archdiocese. The commission was
headed by former Newfoundland lieutenant-governor Gordon Winter, an
Anglican. It found that because Archdiocesan authorities, including
Archbishop Alphonsus Penney, had not acted expeditiously on the
complaints and concerns of priests, parishioner's and concerned parents,
children continued to be abused by some priests. 37 The 700-page report
of the commission also stated that the Church's response to allegations of
abuse took on a familiar pattern after the first reports of problems in 1975
- Church officials aligned themselves with the accused and showed little
compassion for the victim.3The commission went so far as to suggest that
Archbishop Penney may have broken the provincial Child Welfare Act39
by failing to notify provincial authorities of the suspected abuse. 0
The behaviour of Archbishop Penney and of Superintendent Baron in
Newfoundland is not atypical of the behaviour of church officials,
generally, when confronted with reports of abuse by their subordinates.
36. K. Cox, "Teacher ousted over sex charges back at Mount Cashel in 2 years", The Globe and
Mail, September 28, 1989.
37. Supra, note 35, at 137-138.
38. Ibid, at 138.
39. S. Nfld. 1972, Act No. 37, s. 49.
40. Supra, note 35, at 138.
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American joumalist Jason Berry helped to break the story of abuse in the
Louisiana diocese where Gilbert Gauthe was convicted and is writing a
book about sexuality and clerical celibacy. He states that instead of
disciplining the offenders, the Catholic Church in Louisianain most cases
merely moved them out of sight, often to another parish where they
sometimes committed new offences. 41
One striking example of a case in the United States where church
authorities knowingly acted contrary to the interests of potential victims
involved a Louisiana priest, Father Robert Fontenot. Father Fontenot was
suspended from his priestly duties in January, 1984 after he admitted to
sexual misconduct with minors.42 Father Fontenot was ordered to obtain
treatment and counselling at the House of Affirmation in Massachusetts. 43
At the time of his release from the House of Affirmation, the Diocese was
given a report on his progress. The report stated that "because of a long
pattern of secrecy and denial concerning his sexual behaviour.., it is
important that for the protection of himself and adolescents.., he refrain
from ministry that would involve work with adolescent boys." Father
Fontenot was not permitted to return to his priestly duties in Louisiana but
was employed in the adolescent unit of the Deaconess Medical Centre in
Washington. Church authorities from the Diocese of Lafayette, by whom
Father Fontenot continued to be employed, failed to warn the Medical
Centre of the priest's paedophilia.45 In 1986, criminal charges were
brought against Father Fontenot for the sexual abuse of nine former
patients while he was employed in the adolescent care unit.
46
The dangers posed for the public, and especially for children, by the
behaviour of church officials such as Superintendent Baron in the Mount
Cashel case, Archbishop Penney of St. John's, *and the bishop and
vicar-general of the diocese of Lafayette in Louisiana in connection with
Father Fontenot, are best understood in the light of current medical
literature regarding paedophilia. The current medical assessment suggests
that paedophilia is not a curable disorder any more than alcoholism is. 47
Science does offer treatment which includes psychotherapy, behaviour
therapy, surgery, and medication. 48 Treatment helps heal the damage that
41. Supra, note 11, at 12.
42. John Does 1-9 v. Compcare Inc., 763 P.2d 1237 (Wash. App. 1988).
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid., at 1240.
45. Ibid., at 1238.
46. Ibid., at 1241.
47. F. Berlin and E. Krout, Paedophilia: Diagnostic Concepts, Treatment, and Ethical
Considerations 7 (1983), at 165-166.
48. Ibid., at 169.
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has been done, tries to stop the development of the disorder and to
improve the quality of life of the abuser, but the paedophile will never be
cured.4 9 Paedophiliais an ongoing problem. Therefore, avoiding situations
of temptation is as important to the paedophile as it is to the alcoholic.
Working in association with children or youth can be as dangerous for the
paedophile as being a bartender for the alcoholic.50
In light of this current medical assessment responsible church officials
must do everything possible to make sure that a member of the clergy who
is a known or suspected paedophile is never appointed to a ministerial
function that involves or invites association with children.
Who should be held responsible when the acts and omissions of church
officials in response to reports of abuse permit existing abuse to continue
or fall to adequately protect potential victims? That is the issue dealt with
in this article. However, the focus of this article is not on the individual
civil or criminal responsibility of those clergy who are paedophiles and
who commit acts of sexual abuse. Nor is the focus of this article the civil
liability of churches or of religious leaders for the acts of their agents and
subordinates. The starting point for this article is the proposition that
society is justified in seeking redress through the criminal process against
individual abusers, and that victims are entitled to fair compensation in
the civil courts both from the individual abusers and from the churches
and religious organizations concerned.51 The primary focus of this article
is the potential corporate criminal responsibility of churches and church
organizations in connection with incidents of physical and sexual abuse
of children, and to a lesser extent, the potential criminal responsibility of
church officials who act irresponsibly in connection with such incidents.
II. The Analogy Between Churches and Business Organizations
In Canada incorporated bodies, whether business corporations or
incorporated charitable organizations, such as churches, parishes, or
dioceses, are recognized as juridical persons. As such they have a legal
personality separate from those of their members. They have a nationality.
They can hold any form of real or personal property in their own name.
They can sue and be sued in their own name. They enjoy many of the same
privileges and bear many of the same burdens as natural persons.
49. Ibid., at 165-166.
50. Rev. J. E. Paulson, "The Clinical Considerations in Cases of Paedophilia" (1988), 22Studia
canonica 77, at 94.
51. The theoretical basis for the civil liability of Canadas' churches and religious leaders for
the acts of their agents and subordinates, respectively, is also a proper subject for further
exploration.
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Christopher D. Stone has commented that the "the success of the law as
a social instrument - deterring, rehabilitating, securing effective
compensation for victims, educating citizens between right and wrong -
turns upon its capacity to deal with the corporation as a basic unit of
communal activity. '52 Furthermore, Stone suggests that,
Indeed, we do well to think of "corporation" today in something akin to its
original sense, as comprising not merely business corporations, but the
whole range of giantcorporate bureaucracies that have become the peoples
of a modem society: co-operatives, unions, pension funds, university
systems, hospitals, charities, andgovernmental agencies. Suchmischief as
these nonbusiness institutions threaten is neither more confined nor more
controllable, because it is not motivated by profit. 3
While Stone does not expressly mention churches, churches would
certainly fit into his broad conception of corporations. Stone recognizes
that there are undeniable differences between business corporations and
not-for-profit corporations, the most significant of which is the fact that
business corporations are motivated primarily by the desire to make
profits. Nevertheless, he urges that sustained attention be given to the
features which business corporations and other classes of corporate
organization have in common which may "merit their treatment as a class
distinct from other classes of social actors - from ordinary persons, in
particular."54
Stone emphasizes the "organic similarities" between the various types
of corporate and bureaucratic organizations: their size and complexity;
the evaluation of employees and agents on the basis of their performance
in organizational roles; their schooling in management techniques;
common structures to divide authority and to disseminate information;
and the fact that each is a "vehicle for livelihood, prestige, intrigue,
self-fulfilment, aggression and play".55 He points out that much of the
harm done by the various types of corporate organization may be due to
their common bureaucratic features, as a consequence of which their
delicts should be seen "not as mere incidents of tort or crime, but as
primarily and distinctly organizational phenomena":.6
Furthermore, Stone contends that most of the harmful conduct of
corporate organizations "does not have at its root a particular agent who
is so clearly 'to blame' that he or she merits either imprisonment or a
52. C.D. Stone, "The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate Conduct",
(1980), 90 Yale L.J. 1.
53.Ibid., at2.
54. Ibid., at 2-3.
55. Ibid., at 5.
56. Ibid., at 5-6.
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monetary fine extracted in a public ceremony. ''57 Stone recognizes that
there are circumstances in which we may wish to condemn an act as
wrongful, but to ascribe it to the corporation rather than to any particular
agent. According to Stone,
Such an attribution has appeal when, for example, the society wishes to
denounce the conduct and rehabilitate the actor, but the source of the
wrongdoing seems to lie in bureaucratic shortcomings - flaws in the
organizations's formal and informal authority structure, or in its information
pathways - rather than in the, deliberate act of any particular employee. In
these circumstances, it may be more intelligible, and make better policy to
focus the sanction on the enterprise."5
The analogy Stone draws between business corporations affd
not-for-profit corporations as types of bureaucratic organizations which
serve as vehicles for communal activity is of direct relevance to churches
and religious organizations. Many, indeed most, church-related
organizations in Canadatoday, including individual congregations, synods,
dioceses, presbyteries, schools, pension funds, religious orders and
church-sponsored organizations are incorporated as not-for-profit
corporations either under special or private Acts of the provincial
legislatures or the federal parliament, or under general provincial or
federal statutes regulating not-for-profit corporations. 59 Almost thirty
years ago, Max Weber pointed out that the organizational form represented
by the Roman Catholic Church, in particular, is the historical prototype
of all present forms of bureaucratic organization.60 Today, commentators
on the sociology of religion find it useful to study churches generally as
types of bureaucratic organization.61 For example, Kenneth Westhues,
writing in 1976, states that
57. Ibid., at 31.
58. Ibid.
59. See, for instance, An Act to Incorporate the Church Societies of the United Church of
England and Ireland, in the Dioceses of Quebec and Ontario, 1843 (U.C.), c. 68; Act to
Incorporate the Roman Catholic Bishops in Toronto and Kingston, in Canada, in each
Diocese, 1845 (U.C.), c. 82; Anglican Church of Canada Act, S.O. 1979, c. 46, and Ontario
Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 95. The Presbyterians incorporated the managerial boards
for various pension funds in 1847 and also were the first to use the incorporation device in
respect to individual congregations when, in 1849, the Minister and Trustees of St. Andrews
Church, Montreal, were incorporated. See 1847 (U.C.), c. 103 and 1849 (U.C.),c. 136. This
point is made by M. H. Ogilvie, "The Legal Status of Ecclesiastical Corporations" (1989), 15
Can. Bus. L. J. 76, at 87. Ogilvie's article contains a thorough and concise history of the legal
status of Canadian churches.
60. M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Studienaushabe (Cologne and Berlin, 1964), 2
Holbband, p. 880, cited in F.X. Kaufmann, "The Church as a Religious Organization", in G.
Baum and A. Grieby, eds. The Church as Institution, (New York: Hender & Hender, 1974)
70, at 75.
61. F.X. Kaufmann, Ibid.
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From a sociological perspective the Catholic Church is first of all an
organization with a leader, a hierarchy of authority, a chain of command,
goals, an ideology, functionaries, and all the other properties of
organizations. This church conforms to the classic definition of an
organization, "a system of consciously coordinated activities or forces of
two or more persons.
62
Franz-Xaver Kaufmann, a sociologist of religion, has suggested that
the distinguishing feature of churches as a type of organization is that,
although they have experienced the general historical developments of
functional differentiation, bureaucratization, and socialization common
to most large institutions today, the churches' own interpretation of
themselves, rooted as they are in religion and theology, cause them to see
themselves as being endowed with "a particular and essentially
unchangeable structure".63 While Kaufmann's commentrelates to churches
generally, he says that this is especially true of hierarchical churches and
more true of the Catholic Church than of the Protestant churches. 
6
Kaufmannpoints out that the structures of the hierarchical churches, such
as the Catholic Church, were developed hundreds of years ago and
justified on the basis of theological principles.65 He points out that these
hierarchical structures have not kept up with actual developments within
the churches themselves - the increased complexity of the churches and
the growth of unofficial groupings, such as religious orders and
administrative posts, which are not accounted for by the hierarchical
structures of these churches. 66 He sees this as resulting in "organizational
backwardness", in a rejection of the principle of functional organization
adopted by most bureaucracies today, and in a tremendous gap between
decision-making structures as they actually exist and decision-making
authority as recognized or defined by internal church laws.67 It is precisely
these types of "institutional shortcomings" which Stone recognizes as the
source of much corporate wrongdoing and which he sees as onejustification
for, and a proper target of, enterprise or corporate liability.
The concept of injurious conduct arising from institutional shortcomings
has a direct bearing on the problem of clergy paedophilia in Canada and
on the failure of the churches as institutions to respond to reports of abuse
62. K. Westhues, "The Adaptation of the Roman Catholic Church in Canadian Society", in S.
Crysdale and L. Weatcroft, eds. Religion in Canadian Society (Toronto: MacMillan Co. of
Canada, 1976) 290, at 291.
63. Kaufmiann, supra, note 60, at 77.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid., at 71-74.
66. Ibid., at 73.
67. Ibid.
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in a manner appropriate to prevent further abuse. Altogether apart from
any individual wrongs committed by church officials, it appears that the
widespread problem of abuse is attributable, at least in part, to flaws in the
formal and informal authority structures and in the "information pathways"
of the churches and church organizations concerned. For instance, the
Winter Report found that while the Roman Catholic Church is an
institution which wields extensive power within parishes, within the
Archdiocese of St. John's and within the Province of Newfoundland, it
is "crippled by serious weaknesses in personnel, support mechanisms,
administrative structures and management". 61 It also found that while
weak organizational structures and poor government within the
Archdiocesan Church were not the direct causes of the sexual abuse of
children, they allowed the abuse to continue.69
In the case of both Archbishop Penney and Superintendent Baron, it is
questionable whether the diocese or the order had developed clear
policies and procedures for responding to complaints of sexual abuse.
The Winter commission established by the diocese of St. John's to look
into the problem of sexual abuse in the diocese recommended, inter alia,
that the Church revise its policies for reacting to sexual complaints .0 The
Winter Report found that the Archdiocese of St. John's had no policies
and procedures in place until 1990. This lack of policies and procedures
seems difficult to justify in light of the fact that the Canadian Conference
of Catholic Bishops had prepared guidelines for handling allegations of
misconduct, including sexual assault, in August 1987 and had distributed
these guidelines to all Canadian bishops on December 1, 1987.71 The fact
that Archbishop Penney was also unaware of the child abuse reporting
requirements in The Child Welfare Act, 1972,72 of Newfoundland, is
further evidence of the inadequate attention which the Archdiocesan
Church had devoted to the problem of clergy paedophilia.
The Winter Report also revealed a further gap in the Church's structure
which involved the lack of accountability of Church officials to the
faithful, that is, to the laity of the Church who have no authority within
the formal Church hierarchy. The Winter Report recommended that the
Church promote increased communications between church officials and
congregations to change Archbishop Penney's "closed management"
style. 3 The powerlessness of the laity and the unrestrained authority of
68. Supra, note 35, at 138.
69. Ibid.
70. Supra, note 35, at 150-15 1.
71. Ibid., at 149-150.
72. Supra, note 20.
73. Supra, note 35, at 156-157.
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the parish priests in small, close-knit rural communities of Newfoundland
was also cited by psychologist and sexual abuse expert William Marshall,
a professor at Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario, as another
dimension of the sexual abuse scandal confronting the Church in
Newfoundland. 74Marshall, who has visited Newfoundland to counsel
church, police and citizen's groups, urged the Church to limit the
authority granted to parish priests who, "in some communities, are like
God, with no restraints in place.175
Since, as Kaufmann points OUt, 76 the hierarchical structure of the
Roman Catholic Church and of some of the Protestant Churches is
derived from "immutable" theological principles, the churches are
extremely slow to change their internal structures and to respond to
concerns of their congregations. It was only when the sexual abuse
scandal in Newfoundland became public that the Catholic Church in
Newfoundland reacted. The concerns expressedby parishioners were not
enough to force Church officials to take the problem of sexual abuse
seriously. One of the rationales for enterprise liability generally - that it
may force the enterprise to improve its organizational structure, lines of
accountability, information pathways, and policies and procedures for
preventing and responding to corporate wrongdoing - therefore seems
apropos with respect to the widespread and ongoing problem of clergy
paedophilia.
A further analogy between church organizations and business
corporations, which might also suggest a common rationale for the
imposition of enterprise liability on each, is that much of the corporate
wrongdoing done by both of these types of organization is attributable to
the phenomena of institutional loyalty or of loyalty of their agents to the
goals of the institution. Harry Glasbeek suggests, for instance, that much
of the harmful conduct of corporate agents results from their attempts to
meet performance standards generated by the ultimate objectives of
every business corporation, the accumulation of capital and the making
of profits.77 He states that,
If deviance is engaged in because of attempts by personnel to meet
performance standards generated by those goals regardless of means, the
situation would be like that applicable to the corporate organization. 78
74. Supra, note 11, at 12.
75. Ibid.
76. Kaufmann, supra, note 60, at 71-74.
77. H. J. Glasbeek, "Why Corporate Deviance Is Not Treated As A Crime- The Need To Make
'Profits' A Dirty Word" (1984), 22 Osgoode Hall L. J. 393, at 424.
78. Ibid., at 424-425.
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In the case of church officials who respond inappropriately to reports
of sexual abuse by members of the clergy, with the result that existing
abuse continues or further abuse occurs, their failure to respond adequately,
especially where they themselves are not involved in the abuse, may be
attributable to the fact that their primary concern is the protection of the
institutional church. They may feel that by ignoring reports of abuse, by
covering up the abuse, by denying that it exists or by getting rid of the
abuser without making the reasons public, they are protecting the reputation
of the church. They may feel that they are thereby enabling it to carry on
with its spiritual and temporal mission, which they regard as more
important than afew individual members of the church who have become
victims of abuse.
Reverend Jerome C. Paulson, Vicar-general of the diocese of New
Ulm, in Minnesota, describes the difficult position of Catholic bishops
who are confronted with the denunciation of one of their priests for
alleged paedophiliac acts:
In a denunciation case, a bishop has the difficult task of maintaining a
balance between relating compassionately with the faithful who have been
scandalized or who are alleging injury, and with his accused brother priest
who may be suffering from a serious illness and who may also have
committed a serious crime in the canonical or civil sphere, or both. At the
same time, he is obliged to maintain discipline and the observance of
ecclesiastical laws as well as to protect the diocese and the Church as a
whole.79
Rev. Paulson emphasizes the importance of showing the Church's
concern for the victims of sexual abuse. 0 However, the very manner in
which he expresses his rejection of the behaviour of Church officials
which is obviously aimed at protection of the institutional Church
suggests that his own primary concern is the welfare of the Church:
Past experience has shown that if the denouncer perceives the bishop's
main concerns to be those of the protection of the institutional Church, or
the protection of his diocese, his priest or himself, then the bishop is likely
to have more problems. Greater animosity can develop as well as
unfavourable publicity.8 [Emphasis added.]
To the extent that the failure of churches to act responsibly so as to prevent
further sexual abuse results from organizational shortcomings or is
attributable to the attempts by church officials to benefit their church by
protecting it from scandal, the imposition of liability on the church itself
79. Supra, note 50, at 78.
80. Ibid., at 124.
81. Ibid., at 104.
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for such failure is likely to be more of a deterrent of such behaviour in the
fiiture than the targeting of the individual church official.
A further analogy between corporations and churches which suggests
that they should be treated in a similar manner in terms of enterprise
liability is that the relationship between the organization and those who
suffer harm at its hands is, in both cases, often a relationship between the
powerful ruling elite, on the one hand, and the weak, on the other.
A member of society who is not a member of any church or religious
organization mightwonder why the laity, or members of such organizations
who are aware of or who are affected by sexual abuse, permit church
officials to cover up the abuse or trust them to remedy the abusive
situation. As far as the victims of paedophilia - children and youth - are
concerned, the answer to this question often lies in their fear of further
abuse, in their fear that the adults they might tell about the abuse will not
believe them, and in their personal feelings (real though unfounded) of
guilt and shame.8 2 However, as regards the parents of victims who'learn
of the abuse or others, the answer to this question seems less obvious.
The answer to this question may lie in the fact that for a church
member, one's personal identity is closely associated with their faith and
their faith is inextricably tied up with the church or institution which has
always served as the vehicle for the practice and expression of that faith.
Their trust in the institution and in its hierarchy has been nurtured from
an early age and they may feel that not to trust the hierarchy, or to
challenge it, is to deny their faith and their own identity. The church,
linked as it is to their identity, holds tremendous power over them. Just
as the relationship of the abuser to the victim is one of power and
domination, so also is the relation of the church hierarchy to the laity.
Writers, such as Harry Glasbeek, analyze the relationship between
capitalists who own and manage business corporations and the workers
they employ as a class struggle, in which tremendous harm is done to the
workers at the hands of the owners of capital, the ruling elite and their
agents. Glasbeek advocates the use of corporate criminal responsibility
to protect the weaker members of this relationship, the workers." The
relationship between church hierarchies and their members, even in the
more democratically structured congregational-type churches, can also
be seen as a class struggle in which the weak suffer harm at the hands of
powerful. Similarly, the imposition of enterprise liability on churches
82.M. M. Fortune,Sexual Violence: The UnmentionableSin (NewYork: PilgrimPress, 1983),
at xii-xiii.
83. H. J. Glasbeek and S. Rowland, "Are Injuring and Killing At Work Crimes?" (1979), 17
Osgoode Hall W. 506, at 507-523.
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might serve as an effective means of preventing future harm arising from
this unequal relationship.
MI. The Case for Criminal Sanctions
Assuming that there are sound reasons for imposing enterprise liability on
churches and church organizations in situations in which senior clerics
and church officials fail to act in response to reports of clergy paedophilia
in a manner appropriate to prevent future harm, the question arises as to
whether the use of criminal sanctions, as opposed to civil liability, is
justified. The position advocated here is that the use of criminal law is
justified because the conduct of the churches and their agents is, in many
instances, what most members of our society would consider immoral. It
is conduct which displays a wilful disregard, or a wilful blindness to the
right to physical integrity of present and future victims of clergy
paedophilia. Criminal sanctions are justified from the perspective of
deterrence because the problem appears to be widespread. Moreover, the
serious, perhaps irreparable, nature of the harm done to the victims calls
for a dramatic response in order to prevent further harm.
William Marshall predicts that for the children who suffered abuse in
Newfoundland, their families and many communities, "the emotional
suffering will take years to fade" and that many victims will lose their
faith and "may have difficulties with respect to their own identity - they
will blame themselves."' Marshall's assessment is supported by the
story of thermother of one victim of abuse in Newfoundland who recalled:
"My son used to sit at the kitchen table and cry and he would say, 'There
is only one way out - to commit suicide'. He was only 17."11 The
seriousness of the harm done to the victims of paedophilia is further
emphasized by the statements of Dr. Nuala Kenny, Dalhousie University's
head of paediatrics, who was one of five members of the commission
established by the Archdiocese of St. John's. Dr. Kenny, commenting on
the abuse that went on in Newfoundland as a microcosm of sexual abuse
across Canada, stated
I knew that sexual abuse was damaging to children before joining the
commission but my awareness of the depth of the damage and the length
of the damage greatly increased by serving on it.86
Criminal law is used in liberal democratic societies such as ours when,
in-addition to the types of sanctions which can be imposed by the civil
84. Supra, note 11, at 12.
85. Ibid.
86. C. MacKeen, "Offer to resign courageous -Hayes", The Chronicle-Herald, July 19, 1990,
at A2.
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courts and through administrative processes, we wish to publicly condemn
conduct as anti-social and morally unacceptable, when the public
condemnation of behaviour is seen as important to the protection of our
social values.8 7 Admittedly, apart from the general agreement among
Canadians as to the immorality of the intentional killing and maiming of
people, there is widespread disagreement about basic social values.88
However, it can be asserted that the sexual abuse of children is not
condoned. The frequent criminal prosecutions of paedophiles in every
province in Canada are evidence of widespread agreement among
Canadians that the physical and sexual abuse of children is morally and
socially unacceptable. More importantly, however, as far as the criminal
responsibility of churches and of church officials is concerned, the
stringent child abuse reporting requirements found in the legislation in
every province of Canada89 are evidence that the conduct of those who
know about such abuse, and who fail to take action to stop it, is similarly
unacceptable and worthy of moral condemnation. It is also worth noting
that the fact that a church official who, in effect, knowingly permits
existing abuse to continue, or carelessly fails to prevent future abuse, is
not motivated by a desire to inflict harm, but rather to protect the church
or the abuser, is irrelevant to the characterization of his or her behaviour
as criminal in nature. Canadian criminal law expressly accepts the notion
that for a person to do anything, or to omit to do anything that it is her or
her duty to do, in a manner which shows wanton or reckless disregard for
the lives or safety of other persons may amount to criminal negligence.90
In the previous section of this article the argument was put forward that
churches, like business corporations, are the proper targets of liability and
will, if subjected to liability, improve the internal structures of their
organization and exert pressure on individuals within them so as to
produce better behaviour in the future. In other words, enterprise liability
will serve as an important deterrent to prevent future harm. With respect
to the liability of Canada's churches for the acts of senior clerics and
church officials who behave irresponsibly, the imposition ofcivil liability
upon churches for the harm resulting from such conduct is undoubtedly
important and justifiable in order to provide compensation to the victims.
87. See, for instance, D. Stuart, Canadian Criminal Law: A Treatise (Toronto: The Carswell
Company Limited, 1987), at 53-54; and A. W. Mewett and M. Manning, Criminal Law
(Toronto: Butterworth & Co. (Canada) Ltd., 1985), at 11-15.
88. H.J. Glasbeek makes this point in his article "Why Corporate Deviance Is Not Treated As
a Crime - The Need To Make 'Profits' A Dirty Word", supra, note 77, at 402-403.
89. Supra, note 20.
90.R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 219.
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However, the imposition of criminal sanctions on churches may prove to
be a more effective deterrent than the imposition of civil liability.
The churches in the United States have, as mentioned previously,
already demonstrated a willingness to settle civil suits and to pay out large
sums to compensate victims and their families. The willingness of
churches to settle such suits probably arises in part from a sincere
recognition of wrongdoing. However, it is also likely that such settlements
are a response to legal advice aimed at avoiding court findings of
institutional responsibility, which would increase external pressure upon
church organizations to alter their internal structures for reasons unrelated
to theology. Money is, or course, important to churches, both as an
instrument of social and political power and as a means of carrying out
their mission of looking after the spiritual and moral welfare of their
members and of carrying on their charitable activities. Nevertheless,
churches, unlike business corporations, do not have as their primary
objective the making of profits. Given the religious and charitable
objectives of churches and church organizations, it seems logical that a
finding of criminal responsibility on the part of a church, entailing by
implication a finding of immoral behaviour on the part of the church,
would have much more serious implications for it than the loss of money
consequent upon the imposition of civil liability. Accordingly, the
churches are likely to go to greater lengths to avoid a criminal conviction
than they would to avoid the imposition of civil liability.
A further justification for the use of the criminal process against
churches, in addition to the use of civil and administrative processes, is
that one of the basic constitutional principles upon which Canada's
liberal democratic society is built, the rule of law,91 requires that the law,
to use Harry Glasbeek' s words, "punish behaviour which has been judged
unacceptable by society no matter who the perpetrator of the offensive
behaviour is."92 Churches, like business corporations and individuals,
enjoy rights and privileges in our society and must bear similar burdens,
including responsibility and sanctions when they behave in an unacceptable
manner.
In summary then, the use of criminal law to deal with irresponsible
church behaviour in cases involving clergy paedophilia is justified
because: the scope of the problem and serious nature of the harm done to
the victims of paedophilia call for drastic preventative action; because in
91. See, for instance, the judgment of Rand J. in Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959] S.C.R. 121,
at 142 in which Rand refers to the Rule of Law as a "fundamental postulate of our constitutional
structure."
92. Supra, note 83, at 523.
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modem liberal democratic societies such as ours criminal law serves a
standard-setting function and is a vehicle for the condemnation and
stigmatization of anti-social and morally unacceptable behaviour (and
most Canadian's agree that acts or omissions which, in effect, permit
child abuse to continue or recklessly fail to prevent further abuse are
immoral); the imposition of criminal, sanctions is likely to be a more
effective deterrent when dealing with churches and church organizations
than a finding of civil liability; and the rule of law demands that the law
punish those guilty of unacceptable behaviour even when the perpetrator
is a church.
IV. The Case For and Against Corporate Criminal Responsibility
The law on corporate criminal liability in Canada has evolved from the
time when it was considered unthinkable to hold a corporation criminally
responsible to the present time when corporate criminal liability is an
accepted, though not frequent, phenomena. The development of corporate
criminal law both in Canada and in the United States has always been
hindered by the existence of controversial and unresolved questions
about the responsibility and punishment of corporate actors. Amongst the'
questions still debated in Canada and the United States are the following:
whether the objective of deterring corporate crime requires criminal as
well as civil regulation; whether the prosecution of individual agents who
acted on behalf of the corporation may be equally effective or more
effective than the prosecution of the corporate entity; whether it is
possible to identifythe wrongdoer and to attribute his or her behaviour to
the corporation on a satisfactory basis; and whether it is possible to devise
effective sanctions against corporations.9 Since the same questions may
be raised and debated in the context of the criminal responsibility of
churches and church organizations, it is important to confront some of the
93. B. Fisse, "Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault and
Sanctions" (1983), 56 Southern California L.Rev. 1141, at 1145; J. Braithwaite, "Enforced
Self-Regulation: A New Strategy for Corporate Crime Control" (1982), 80 Mich. L.R. 1466;
B. Coleman, "Is Corporate Criminal Liability Really Necessary" (1975), 29 Southwestern L.J.
908; C.J. Coffee Jr., "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the
Problem of Corporate Punishment" (1979), 79 Mich. L.R. 386; E.R. Elkins, "Corporations and
the CriminalLaw: An Uneasy Alliance" (1976), 65 Kentucky L.J. 73; E. Lederman, "Criminal
Law, Perpetrator & Corporation: Rethinking a Complex Triangle" (1985), 76 J. Crim. Law &
Criminology 285; and C.D. Stone, "The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of
Corporate Conduct" supra, note 52. See, for instance, H. J. Glasbeek, "Why Corporate
Deviance Is Not Treated As A Crime -The Need To Make Profits A Dirty Word", supra, note
77; Law Reform Commission of Canada, "Criminal Responsibility for Group Action" (1976),
Working Paper 16; L.H. Leigh, "The Criminal Liability of Corporations and Other Groups"
(1977), 9 Ottawa L.R. 247.
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arguments frequently made against the concept of corporate criminal
responsibility.
Under current Canadian law, if a corporate agent commits a crime
while acting within the scope of his or her authority and with the intent
to benefit the corporation or with the result that the corporation is
benefitted, then the corporation may be held criminally responsible for
these acts.94 One of the arguments marshalled against imposing criminal
liability on corporations is that of the traditional aims of criminal law -
deterrence, prevention, retribution and rehabilitation - only deterrence
plays an important role in criminal liability.95 This argument goes on to
point out that deterrence of corporate activity relies primarily upon the
threat which criminal fines pose to corporate profits,9 6 and that in order
to provide an adequate threat the penalties must be high, and accordingly,
more similar in amount to civil monetary penalties97 than to traditional
criminal fines. Those who put forth this argument conclude that criminal
sanctions serve no useful purpose that cannot be equally well served by
the imposition of civil liability awards, complemented when appropriate
by individual criminal sanctions.98
Writers such as Brent Fisse respond to this argument by pointing out
is that it takes "insufficient account of the deterrent value resulting from
the stigma of criminal conviction" and that it "neglects important
non-financial values in corporate decision making". 99 Interestingly Fisse
notes that in some types of organizations, "most notably churches",
non-monetary motivations take precedence over monetary concerns. °°
As discussed in the previous section of this article, criminal sanctions
entail a moral condemnation of certain behaviour that is absent from civil
and administrative penalties. 1 ' While the symbolic value of criminal
sanctions may be doubted in the case of business corporations, it is likely
to serve as an effective deterrent against churches and church organizations
because it is the antipathy of the raison d'etre of such corporate entities.
94. Canadian Dredge & Dock Company, Limited, Marine Industries Limited, The J.P. Porter
Company Limited, and Richelieu Dredging Corporation Inc. v. R., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 662.
95. Developments in the Law - Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behaviour Through
Criminal Sanctions" (1979), 92 Harvard L.R. 1222, at 1235-36.
96. Ibid., at 1235.
97. Ibid., at 1368, 1370.
98. Ibid., at 1365-75 and Comment, "The Economic Inefficiency of Corporate Criminal
Liability", (1982), 73 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 582, at 586-87, 599-602.
99. Fisse, supra, note 93, at 1147.
100. Ibid., at 1155.
101. See Oberdick, "The Role of Sanctions and Coercion in Understanding Law and Legal
Systems" (1976), 21 Am. J. Juris. 71, 77-78. Oberdick points out that the moral blame which
a criminal sanction symbolizes is important in prohibiting the targeted behaviour.
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If the deterrent effect of criminal sanctions is successful, then
rehabilitation in the form of the implementation by the corporation of
effective crime prevention policies, disciplinary controls, and changes in
defective or inadequate standard operating procedures should follow."0 2
It is hoped that rehabilitation in this sense would be the result of imposing
criminal sanctions on churches with respect to the failure of church
officials to act in a manner appropriate to stop existing sexual abuse or to
prevent further abuse. The Winter Report, as mentioned previously,
found that although the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops had
issued guidelines for dealing with allegations of misconduct and had
distributed these to all Canadian bishops, Archbishop Penney had not
followed them. Where such standard operating procedures exist but are
breached, the imposition of criminal sanctions on the church should serve
as a catalyst for internal church discipline.
A second argument marshalled against corporate criminal responsibility
is that it is more just and more effective to punish those individuals within
the corporation who are guilty of wrongdoing than to punish the
corporation, especially if the offence involves ajail sentence. 0 3 Holding
the corporation responsible rather than the individual may only serve to
obscure the fact that the people who are really guilty of wrongdoing are
attempting to feather their own nests rather than trying to please the
corporate entity. Where the motivation behind the conduct of the guilty
agent is self-interest and the crime is attributable to the behaviour of one
or more individuals who are truly blameworthy, and not to the collective
failure of many corporate actors and/or to organizational shortcomings,
then it may well be fairer and more effective to punish the individuals
rather than the corporation. In some circumstances, however, it will no
doubt be possible to attribute the harmful conduct to one or more
corporate agents whose conduct deserves punishment as well as to
organizational shortcomings which make such conduct possible. In such
102. Fisse, supra, note 93, at 1159-1163; and Stone, supra, note 52.
103. For an example of how this argument is articulated see Bruce Coleman, supra, note 93.
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circumstances, it makes sense to punish both the individuals and the
corporation. 10 4
To advocate corporate criminal liability is notto exclude the possibility
of prosecuting individual wrongdoers. What is being advocated here is
that in appropriate circumstances churches and church organizations
should be subject to criminal sanctions, because such sanctions will serve
as the most effective deterrent of the unacceptable behaviour. In order to
determine whether, in any particular instance, it is possible to realize the
objectives of deterrence and rehabilitation by imposing liability on the
church, it is necessary to examine the way in which a particular church
and its decision-making processes are organized. 1°5 Simeon M. Kriesberg,
who has developed different models of corporate decision-making,
argues that,
The definition of criminal responsibility that emerges from decision-making
models is a functional one: responsibility lies with whichever corporate
decision-makers were capable of preventing the corporate offense that
occurred. The models imply that the identity of these decision-makers
varies according to the characterofthe corporate decision-making process. 06
Kriesberg identifies three models of corporate decision-making. In
Model I the corporation can be seen as a unitary entity in which all
decisions are made as part of a rational decision-making process activated
by corporate problems, framed by corporate alternatives, and guided by
corporate values. Kreisberg suggests that where corporate decision-making
accords with Model I, the corporate entity itself, for whose benefit
decisions are made, may be the proper target of criminal responsibility.
In Kriesberg's Model II the corporation consists of a host of loosely
connected decision-making units (such as a marketing group, a
104. The deterrent value of prosecuting both the corporation and the individual within the
corporation who could have prevented the harmful conduct has been recognized in Canada in
the field of environmental law. See forinstance, The Environmental Enforcement Statute Law
AmendmentAct, S.O 1986, c. 68, which was passed and came into force on December 18,1986.
The Act amended three key environmental statutes in Ontario in order to clarify and extend the
penal liability of corporate officers and directors, municipalities and the Crown. The
provisions impose a duty on directors and officers of corporations to take all reasonable care
to prevent the corporation from causing or permitting pollution. Failure to do so may result in
the director or officer being found guilty of an offence, whether or not the corporation is
prosecuted or convicted, with the possibility of imprisonment for up to one year for flagrant
violations of the statute involving actual pollution or violations of stop offers. See also cases
such as R. v. B.E.S.T. Plating Shoppe Ltd andSiapas (1988), 1 C.E.L.R. (N,S.) 145 (Ont. C.A.)
in which both the corporation and its chief executive officer were prosecuted in relation to acts
causing pollution.
105. S.M. Kriesberg, Note, "Decision-making Models and the Control of Corporate Crime",
(1967), 85 Yale L. J. 1091.
106. Ibid., at 1099.
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manufacturing division, a research group), each of which has some
autonomy and control over a narrow range functions, with respect to
which decisions are made on the basis of standard operating procedures.
Kriesberg contends that in a Model II situation there are valid reasons for
imposing liability on both the corporate entity, whose standard operating
procedures are inadequate or defective, and upon individual corporate
managers with knowledge or authority with respect to unlawful or
inadequate standard operating procedures. 10 7 Finally, according to
Kriesberg's Model III, corporate decision-making is the outcome of a
bargaining game involving a hierarchy of players and a maze of formal
and informal channels, in which each decision is the result of a single
game, with the identity of the players dependent on the issues involved
and the organizational structure. Kriesberg suggests that in a Model III
situation individual actors involved in the bargaining rather than the
corporate entity should be held criminally responsible."
Although Kriesberg's comments are addressed to business
organizations, it will be equally important to examine the nature of a
church's organizational structure and decision-making processes in order
to determine whether the aims of deterrence and rehabilitation can be
achieved by imposing liability on the church. David Frohlich points out
that the three major categories of church polity are congregational,
hierarchical and presbyterial. 0 9 In hierarchical churches, such as the
Roman Catholic Church, the Anglican Church and the Greek and Russian
Orthodox Churches, the individual congregations are subordinate members
of the general and larger church and poweris placed in clerical superiors.' 0
In congregational churches, such as the Unitarian Church, the Baptist
Church, the Quaker Church and the Jewish Church, local churches are
autonomous, governed either by a majority of the congregation or by
another local body which the members have implemented for that
purpose. The local congregation owes no loyalty or obligation to any
higher denominational authority.11' In presbyterial churches, such as the
Presbyterian Church, each local congregation is largely autonomous in
directing its own affairs, but elects representatives to the denomination's
governing bodies which exercise the authority - of the general
denominational organization through a hierarchy of governing bodies.l"2
107. Ibid., at 1112-1115.
108. Ibid., at 1121-1124.
109. D. Frolich, supra, note 30.
110. Ibid., at 1389.
111. Ibid.
112. Ibid.
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The three different types of church polity described by Frohlich do not
fit neatly the three different models of corporate decision-making identified
by Kriesberg. Furthermore, as Franz-Xaver Kaufmann points out there
may be a gap between a church's formal organizational structure and its
actual decision-making processes. Kriesberg's models may, nonetheless,
provide some insights into the circumstances in which responsibility
should be imposed on churches or church organizations. For example,
Kriesberg explains that the essence of Model I is that it treats the
behaviour of corporate employees as sufficiently concerted to justify
treating their numerous individual acts as a unitary corporate
decision-making process aimed at maximizing the corporation's values:
Furthermore, Kriesberg points out that the fewer persons and hierarchical
levels involved in the particular decision, the more likely it is that Model,
I will provide useful insights." 3 On the other hand, Kriesberg points out
that among the characteristics of Model III are the fact that the
decision-making process lacks the purposefulness and consistency that
are basic to Model I, and that "the result of the Model III process is only
by coincidence, if at all, the course of action that maximizes the values of
the entity as a whole."'" 4
The essential elements of a Model I type of situation may exist in any
of the three types of church polity described by Frohlich. They may exist
in a local congregational church, or in the local incorporated diocese of
a larger hierarchical church, or in the structure of a lay order. If the church
officials are acting to achieve a singular objective, such as the protection
of the institutional church, then Model Isuggests that it willbe appropriate
to impose criminal liability on the corporate entity. If the church officials
are acting out of institutional loyalty, and the wrongdoing is also attributable
in part to organizational shortcomings, such as the "serious weaknesses
in personnel, support mechanisms and management" which the Winter
Report found to exist in Newfoundland, then Models I and II might both
suggest that there is a sound basis for imposing liability on the church.
Each case will require individual analysis to determine whether the
prosecution of individual wrongdoers or of the church or of both will most
effectively deter further harm.
Another objection to imposing criminal responsibility on business
corporations is that it punishes innocent people. The objection is that it is
the shareholders, who in most cases have not participated in the crime,
and the consumer of the corporation's goods and services, who ultimately
113. Supra, note 105, at 1101, 1111.
114.Ibid.,at 1105.
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bear the burden of the corporate fine through decreased dividends and
increased prices, respectively.115 The analogous argument applicable to
churches and other charities is that theimposition ofcriminalresponsibility
is contrary to the public interest because the payment of criminal fines
will eat up the funds which charitable organizations have available for
charitable good works, and criminal convictions will cost them prospective
donors. This was part of the rationale for the doctrine of charitable
immunity from tort action once widely accepted in most states in the
United States, but now at least partially abandoned by most. 116 In answer
to this argument it is worth pointing out, firstly, that the doctrine of
charitable immunity has never existed in Canada, and secondly, that
criminal fines pose no greater threat to a charity's capacity to provide a
valuable public benefit than civil compensatory judgments. However,
even if liability would jeopardize a charity's capacity to function,
immunity to criminal liability is not ajust response where it would permit
an intolerableinfringement of an individual's rights to go unpunished and
would violate the rule of law.
The objection that churches and other charities should not be held
criminally responsible because criminal penalties threaten their capacity
to benefit the public is one variation of the more general objection to
criminal corporate responsibility that fines are an ineffective and unjust
sanction against corporate wrongdoing.117 Fines have been criticized on
the grounds that: they punish the wrong people - innocent shareholders
and consumers;118 that historically they have been too low to effectively
deter corporations which simply write them off as a business expense;' 19
115. Bruce Coleman, supra, note 93, at 920.
116. For a further understanding of the American doctrine of charitable immunity see "The
Inequality of Mercy: 'Charitable Torts' and Their Continuing Immunity" (1987), 100 Harvard
L.R. 1382.
117. See, forinstance, C. Stone, "The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate
Conduct, suprd, note 52, at 3 6-57 (which discuses the inadequacy and inefficiency of corporate
fines); Kadish,"Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic
Regulations" (1963), 30 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 423, at434 (doubting the deterrent effect ofcriminal
fines on corporations); and Comment, "The Economic Inefficiency of Corporate Criminal
Liability" (1982), 73 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 582.
118. See B. Coleman, supra, note 93, at 920, and see, "Corporate Criminal Liability", (1928)
28 Colum. L Rev. 181, at 187 and C. Stone, ibid., at 47-48.
119. See Comment, "Criminal Sanctions for Corporate Illegality" (1978), 69 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 40, at 48, and Comment, "Increasing Community Control over Corporate Crime
- A Problem in the Law of Sanctions" (1961), 71 Yale L. J. 280, at 297-305 (which argues that
corporate fines should be sufficiently high to deprive corporations of illegal profits and to
provide compensation for victims).
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that they do not address the non-financial motivations behind corporate
misconduct; 120 and that they give the corporation too much freedom to
decide what, if any, internal reorganization or disciplinary action to
initiate in order to prevent further wrongdoing.'
As Brent Fisse points such arguments against criminal liability, based
on the limitations of fines as a sanction, ignore the deterrent value of the
stigmatization which a conviction symbolizes. 122 As suggested previously,
a criminal conviction, in and of itself, is likely to be a more effective
deterrent against churches and church organizations than againstbusiness
corporations, given the non-financial motivations of such entities. That
is not to suggest that the inadequacies of fines as a sanction be ignored.
Rather an attempt should be made to develop alternative kinds of
sanctions designed to achieve the traditional goals of criminal law -
deterrence, rehabilitation and retribution. Several of the sanctions
suggested by reform agencies and commentators are of partidular interest
because of their potential effectiveness against churches and church
corporations.
As suggested previously, one of the reasons for imposing entity
liability on churches would be to put pressure on the church to initiate
organizational changes or internal disciplinary procedures, or to modify
or introduce preventative policies and procedures. In light of this goal
Christopher Stone's proposal for the use of organizational reform orders
as a criminal sanction against corporation's seems especially appropriate
for use against churches and church organizations. In Stone's Proposed
Model Code for Corporate Rehabilitation' 13 he recommends that the
courts be authorized to require a corporate offender to prepare and file a
"Proposed Rehabilitation Agenda" when it appears that the corporate
wrongdoing stemmed from defective or inadequate company policies
and procedures. 2 4 The agenda that Stone envisaged would include a
statement of the corporation's findings as to why the wrongful conduct
120. See C. Stone, supra, note 52, at 43; and Coffee, "'No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick':
An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment" (1981), 79 Mich.
L.Rev. 386, at 393-94.
121. See C. Stone, ibid., at 57, in which he makes the point that imposing even substantial
criminal fines on corporations "is no guarantee that they will respond as we should like."
122. Supra, note 93, at 1220.
123. See "Corporate Rights and Responsibilities: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Commerce", 94th Conf., 2d Sess. 297-301 (1976) (appendix to statement of Christopher D.
Stone, "Stone Proposed Model Code for Corporate Rehabilitation").
124. Ibid., at 297.
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arose, identifying problems with the companies policies, practices and
procedures, and a statement as to the measures which the company
proposes to take in order to prevent future harm. 25
One advantage of Stone's proposal is that it avoids undue interference
with the internal affairs of the corporate entity, an advantage of particular
concern with respect to churches and church organizations, with respect
to which an order directing particular changes might be seen as an undue
interference with religious freedom. At the same time the implementation
of this type of sanction is consistent with a view expressed in 1976 by the
Law Reform Commission of Canada:
In a society moving increasingly towards group action it may become
impractical, in terms of allocation of resources, to deal with systems
through their components. In many cases it would appear more sensible to
transfer to the corporation the responsibility of policing itself, forcing it to
take steps to ensure that harm does not materialize through the conduct of
people within the organization. Rather than having the state monitor the
activities of each person within the organization, which is costly and raises
practical enforcement difficulties, it may be more efficient to force the
corporation to do this, especially if sanctions imposed on the corporation
can be translated into effective action at the individual level.126
Another type of sanction which might prove effective against churches
and church organizations, particularly where the harmful conduct is
attributable in part to the attempt by church officials to protect the
reputation of the institution, is the use of court-ordered adverse publicity.
The use of court-ordered adverse publicity as a criminal sanction against
corporations was recommended by the American National Commission
on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws in 1970, 127and has received support
from various commentators. 128 Brent Fisse suggests that the Court could
quantify the sanction at the time of sentencing in terms of media time or
space and cost.129 Although the impact of court-ordered adverse publicity
would, as John Coffee points out, 30 be uncertain, the same can be said of
fines which are not quantified according to the means of the defendant or
125. Ibid.
126. The Law Reform Commission of Canada, "Criminal Responsibility for Group Action"
(1976), Working Paper 16, at 31.
127. National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, StudyDraft ofa New Federal
Criminal Code 405(1)(a)(1970).
128. B. Fisse, "The Use of Publicity As a Crirninal Sanction Against Business Corporations",
(1971), 8 Melbourne Un. L.R. 107; and Gellhorn, "Adverse Publicity by Administrative
Agencies", (1973), Harv. L. R. 1380, 1419-21.
129. Supra, note 93, at 1231.
130. J.C. Coffee, supra, note 93, at 427.
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their impact upon him or her. The use of adverse publicity as a sanction
is ideally suited to address the non-financial motivations of churches and
church organizations.
Yet another sanction which would be appropriate for use against
churches and churchorganizations, especially where the wrongful conduct
permits the continuation of or commission of further acts of sexual abuse,
is a court order requiring the corporate defendant to follow a particular
course of action in order to compensate the victim or to provide redress
to him or her.131 Brent Fisse suggests, for instance, that "punitive
discovery orders might be used to expedite or increase the flow of
information from convicted corporate defendants to plaintiffs in subsequent
civil litigation", 3 2 or that the defendant corporation be required "to
publicize the conviction and thereby provide notice to potential
claimants."'33 Such sanctions would be unnecessary where the church or
church organizationhad already demonstrated awillingness to compensate
victims, as has often been the case with the Roman Catholic Church both
in the U.S. and Canada,13 but could be very useful where no such
willingness has been expressed.
The implementation of organizational reform orders, adverse publicity
orders or "redress facilitation orders"1 35 for use against churches and
other corporate offenders would, of course, require a long term program
of statutory reform of the criminal sanctions available under Canada's
Criminal Code and raises some constitutional questions concerning the
federal/provincial division of powers which would have to be addressed
and resolved. 136In the meantime, however, the limitations of fines as a
sanction should not be treated as an adequate justification for a refusal by
society to impose criminal responsibility on churches for socially
unacceptable behaviour. The same limitations have not prevented the
prosecution and conviction of business corporations. Furthermore,
attaching the mark of Cain to a church by way of a criminal conviction
alone is likely to have a much more dramatic deterrent effect against the
church than it would against a business corporation.
131. Supra, note 126, at46-47 where the Law Reform Commission of Canada emphasizes the
need for redress for victims of corporate crime.
132. Supra, note 93, at 1232.
133. Ibid.
134. See supra, note 32, and "Abused altar boy families paid $150,000", Calgary Herald,
February 13, 1990, A3.
135. This is the general term which Brent Fisse uses for punitive discovery orders, orders for
notice to potential claimants and similar orders. See Fisse, supra, note 93, at 1231-33.
136. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
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V. The Position of the Corporation in Criminal Law
In Canada all criminal and quasi-criminal offences are created by
statute. 37 The basis on which a corporation may be held criminally
responsible varies according to the type of offence with which the
corporation is charged. The courts have developed a system of classification
which separates offences on the basis of the degree of intent, if any,
required to establish liability. Criminal and quasi-criminal offences may
fall into one of three classes: absolute liability offences, strict liability
offences, and offences requiring mens rea.138
Absolute liability offences are offences for which liability attaches
immediately upon the breach of the statutory prohibition. No proof of
intent or of any particular state of mind is required. With respect to such
offences the corporation is treated the same as a natural person. The
corporation has automatic primary responsibility for the breach. 139
Strict liability offences are offences for which liability attaches not
upon the breach of the statute, but rather upon proof of the actus reus,
subject to the defence of due diligence. 140With respect to such offences
corporations are, as in the case of absolute liability offences, treated the
same as natural persons. Liability is primary, and in accordance with the
terms of the statue concerned, arises in the same way as with respect to
absolute liability offences.14 1 The liability of the corporation does not
depend on the attribution to it of the misconduct of others, except in the
sense that the corporation, being a fictitious legal person, can only act
through its agents and employees. The Supreme Court of Canada has
been very clear that liability for such offences is primary, not vicarious.14
Most crimes are offences requiring proof of mens rea, the presence of
a guilty mind. Where the accused is a corporation, it is necessary to find
within the corporation some natural person whose guilty mind can be
attributed to the corporation. One of the most difficult barriers to the
imposition of criminalresponsibility upon corporations was the attribution
of mens rea to a corporation.143 English and Canadian courts have
137. Ibid., s. 9(a).
138. Supra, note 94, at 673-674.
139. Ibid., at 674.
140. R. v. City of Sault Ste. Marie, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299.
141. Supra, note 94, at 674.
142. Ibid.
143. The transition from virtual corporate immunity from criminal liability to virtual equality
with humans in like circumstances under the criminal law is traced in detail by Jessup J. in R.
v. J.J. Beamish Construction Co.,[1966] 2 O.R. 867 and by Schroeder J.A. of the Court of
Appeal of Ontario, inR. v. St. Lawrence Corp.,[1969] 2 O.R. 305, at 315-21. See also Leigh,
"The Criminal Liability of Corporations and Other Groups" (1971), 9 U. Ott L. R. 247.
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overcome this barrier by adopting a pragmatic approach. The courts in
Canada and the United Kingdom, unlike the courts in the United States
have refused to apply the principle of respondeat superior'44 as the basis
of corporate criminal responsibility. In the United States, where corporate
criminal responsibility is based on the doctrine of respondeat superior,
vicarious criminal responsibility of the corporation can arise out of the
criminal acts of any employee regardless of his or her status in the
corporation.145 As explained by Estey J. of the Supreme Court of Canada
in Canadian Dredge & Dock Co. v. The Queen "criminal responsibility
in our courts thus far has been achieved in the mens rea offences by the
attribution of the acts of its employees and agents on the more limited
basis of the doctrine of the directing mind or identification."'46 As Mr.
Justice Estey goes on to explain the identification doctrine,
is a court-adopted principle put in place for the purpose of including the
corporation in the pattern of criminal law in a rational relationship to that
of the natural person. The identity doctrine merges the board of directors,
the managing director, the superintendent, the manager or anyone else
delegated by the board of directors to whom is delegated the governing
executive authority of the corporation, and the conduct of any of the
merged entities is thereby attributed to the corporation. In St. Lawrence,
supra, and other authorities, a corporation may, by this means have more
than one directing mind. This must be particularly so in a country such as
Canada where corporate decisions are frequently geographically
widespread. 47
In order for a corporate agent's action and intent to result in the
criminal responsibility of the corporation, the agent must be found by the
Court to be "a vital organ of the body corporate and virtually its directing
mind and will in the sphere of duty and responsibility assigned to him so
that his action and intent are the very action and intent of the company
itself."'' 4 While the guilty mind of just any low-level employee will not
be adequate to convict the corporation, the act need not have been
authorized by the board of directors, nor need the act or intent be that of
a director or chief executive officer of the corporation. As Bruce Welling
points out, the case law demonstrates that the corporation can be convicted
where "mens rea can be fixed upon an official who, according to the
formal corporate structure, is responsible for the department or activities
144. Supra, note 94, at 686.
145. Ibid.
146. Ibid., at 691.
147. Ibid., at 693.
148. R. v. St. Lawrence Corp., supra, note 143, per Schroeder J.A., at 320, adopting the
statement of Jessup J. in R. v. J.J. Beamish Construction Co., supra, note 143.
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in which the actus reus occurred." 14 9 The employee must be one who has
been entrusted by the corporation with actual authority to make decisions
in the field of operation in which the criminal act occurred. In some cases
the delegation of authority will be expressed in the corporation's
constitutional documents. -In other circumstances it will be implied
authority, a grant of authority to the agent which can be inferred from the
course of dealings between the corporation and its agent. 150
The outer limits of the identification doctrine were considered by the
Supreme Court of Canadain 1985 in Canadian Dredge & Dock Co. v. The
Queen." ' Estey J., speaking for the Court stated:
...in my view the identification theory only operates where the Crown
demonstrates that the action taken by the directing mind (a) was within the
field of operation assigned to him; (b) was not totally in fraud of the
corporation; and (c) was by design or result partly for the benefit of the
company.1
5 2
It is no defence for the corporation to argue that the criminal actions of the
employee were beyond the scope of the agent's employment, since all
corporations would argue that any criminal action must prima facie be
beyond the scope of an employee's duty and authority 53 Provided the
corporate agent was acting within the sector of corporate operation
assigned to him or her while he or she was carrying out his or her assigned
function in the corporation, the acts of the managerial agent will give rise
to corporate criminal responsibility. This is so "whether or not there be
formal delegation; whether or not there be awareness of the activity in the
board of directors or the officers of the company; and whether or not there
be express prohibition.' 1 14 Canadian law does not recognize a defence of
express prohibition, because if it did a corporation could avoid criminal
149. B. Welling, Corporate Law In Canada: The Governing Principles (Toronto: Butterworth
& Co. (Canada) Ltd., 1984), at 162, citing in support D,P.P. v. Kent and Sussex Contractors
Co. Ltd.,[1944] K.B. 146 (Eng., D.C.); R. v. I.C.R. Haulage Ltd.,[1944] K.B. 551 (Eng.,
C.C.A.); andR. v. Fane Robinson Ltd.,[1941] 2W.W.R. 235, [1941]3 D.L.R. 409,76 C.C.C.
196 (Alta. C.A.).
150. One of the leading cases on implied actual authority of acorporate agentis Hely-Hutchinson
v. Brayhead Ltd., [1967]3 All E.R. 98 (Eng., C.A.). Foran example of a case in which the acts
and intent of a non-management employee resulted in the criminal conviction of the corporate
employer as a consequence of the implied delegation of authority to the agent to make
unsupervised decisions in the field of operation in which the criminal act occurred see R. v.
Waterloo Mercury Sales Ltd., [1974] 4 W.W.R. 516,49 D.L.R. (3d) 131, 18 C.C.C.(2d) 248,
27 C.R.N.S.55 (Alta. Q.B.). For an interesting discussion of the Waterloo Mercury case see
Welling, supra, note 149, at 165-166.
151. Supra, note 94.
152. Ibid., at 713-714.
153. Ibid., at 684.
154. Ibid., at 685.
Paedophilia: The Criminal Responsibility of Canada's Churches
responsibilities simply by adopting and conveying to its agents and
employee's a general instruction prohibiting illegal conduct.'55
However, as Estey J.'s judgment in Canadian Dredge & Dock Co. v.
The Queen makes clear, the corporation will not be held criminally
responsible if the agent's acts were "totally in fraud" of the corporate
employer. According to Estey J.'s judgment the criminal act is totally in
fraud of the corporate employer where it "is intended to and does result
in benefit exclusively to the employee-manager", "when the directing
mind ceases completely to act, in fact or in substance, in the interests of
the corporation."' 156
As far as the criminal responsibility of Canada's churches or church
organizations for acts of paedophilia is concerned, it is clear that the acts
and intent of those clergy who commit acts of sexual abuse could not be
attributed to the corporate entity on the basis of the identification
doctrine, even if committedby a senior cleric or church official. Such acts
cannot be said to benefit the church, but are indeed contrary to everything
that most churches stand for. However, the acts or omissions of a
managing employee of a church to whom acts of sexual abuse are
reported, or who has knowledge of such abuse, but who falls to act in a
manner appropriate to prevent further abuse, might very well be attributable
to the corporate entity. The behaviour of such amanaging-employee, who
has actual express or implied decision-making authority, might be seen
as benefitting the church either by design or by result by protecting its
reputation from scandal, at least in the short term.
The determination of the extent of the actual decision-making authority
of a particular cleric would, as in the case of an employee of a business
corporation, have to be determined by looking at internal church documents
setting forth the formal church hierarchy and allocation of decision-making
powers, as well as by examining any course of conduct which might have
given rise to an implied extension of actual authority. In many
circumstances the formal church structure will be sufficient to establish
the actual decision-making authority of the particular cleric to deal with
reports of abuse. Such is the case with respect to Archbishop Penney in
relation to reports of acts of abuse committed by priests within the
Archdiocese of St. John's Newfoundland, and with respect to
Superintendent Baron in relation to reports of acts of abuse committed by
members of the Christian Brothers at Mount Cashel.157
155. Ibid., at 699.
156. Ibid., at 712,713.
157. Supra, note 50, at 102-103, citing J. Coriden, T. Green, D. Heintschel, eds. The Code of
Canon Law: A Text and Commentary, (New York: Mahwah, Paulist Press, 1985), at 440,
Canons 292, 381,391 and 392.
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VI. Potentially Applicable Criminal Law Provisions
The following is a consideration of those few Criminal Code provisions
which might possibly be used to condemn the behaviour of churches and
church officials who, as a result of inappropriate and irresponsible
responses to reports of clergy paedophilia, permit such abuse to continue
or fail to prevent further abuse. The purpose of this section of the article
is to show that the application of the Criminal Code to the acts and
omissions of church officials is at least plausible.
As mentioned earlier in Part II of this article most churches and
church-related organizations in Canada today, including individual
congregations, synods, dioceses, presbyteries, schools, pension funds,
religious orders and church-sponsored organizations are incorporated as
not-for-profit corporations either under special or private Acts of the
provincial legislatures orthe federal parliament, orundergeneral provincial
or federal statutes regulating not-for-profit corporations.'58 Thus most
churches and church organizations, as "corporate bodies", would certainly
be subject to the provisions of the Criminal Code, s. 2 of which provides:
"everyone", "person", "owner", and similar expressions include Her
Majesty and public bodies, bodies corporate, societies, companies and
inhabitants of counties, parishes, municipalities or other districts in
relation to the acts and things that they are capable of doing and owning
respectively; [emphasis added]
Sections 620-623 of the Code contain the procedural provisions concerning
the appearance ofacorporation on acriminal charge, notices to corporations
concerning criminals charges, the procedure to be followed on the default
of appearance of a corporation, and the trial of a corporation. Section 719
of the Code makes provision for the imposition of fines as sanctions
against convicted corporations. All of these sections of the Code would
be applicable to the prosecution of a church or religious organization.
1. Criminal Negligence Causing Bodily Harm: Sections 219 and 221
The criminal offence with the greatest potential application to churches
in connection with the acts and omissions of church officials in response
to reports of clergy paedophilia appears to be the offence of criminal
negligence causing bodily harm. The relevant provisions of the Criminal
Code are as follows:
219.(1) Everyone is criminally negligent who
(a) in doing anything, or
(b) in omitting to do anything that it is his duty to do,
shows wanton or reckless disregard for the lives or safety of other persons.
158. See note 59, and accompanying text.
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(2) For the purposes of this section, "duty" means a duty imposed by
law.
221. Everyone who by criminal negligence causes bodily harm to
another person is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment
for a term not exceeding ten years.
The wording of this offence and the name of the offence itself invite
comparisons with the tort of negligence. In tort law liability is based on
an objective test. Where X can or should reasonably foresee that his or her
behaviour is likely to injure Y and then behaves in a manner which falls
short of the standard of care of a reasonable person, then X will be held
liable to compensate Y for any injury which Y may have incurred as a
result of X's behaviour. However, the present state of the law in Canada
with respect to the test of culpability in criminal negligence cases, which
can be traced to a series of Sipreme Court of Canada decisions in the
1960s, concerning the offences of dangerous driving and criminal
negligence, seems to be that merely establishing a departure from an
objective standard of care is not sufficient to ground a finding of criminal
negligence."9
In order to succeed on a charge of criminal negligence the Crown must
prove the guilty mind of the accused in the sense of subjective intent. In
a case of criminal negligence the subjective intent is established by
showing the advertence or subjective foresight of the accused as to the
consequences of his or her conduct.160
There have, in recent years, been several decisions of the Ontario Court
of Appeal which have ignored the subjective test of criminal negligence
set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in O'Grady v. Sparling161 in 1960
in favour of a more objective standard, at least in cases of criminal
negligence involving driving. 162 Even in some of the early Supreme Court
159. See O'Grady v. Sparling (1960), 128 C.C.C. 1, 33 C.R. 293, [1960] S.C.R. 804; Mann v.
The Queen, [1966] 2 C.C.C. 273,47 C.R. 400, [1966] 5 C.R. 238; Binus v. The Queen, [1968]
1 C.C.C. 227,2 C.R.N.S. 118, [1967] S.C.R. 594; Peda v. The Queen, [1969) 4 C.C.C. 245,
7 C.R.N.S. 243, [1969] S.C.R. 905.
160. Binus v. The Queen, ibid., at 233 C.C.C., 123 C.R.N.S. per Judson J.
161. Supra, note 159.
162. In R. v. Sharp (1984), 12 C.C.C. (3d) 428,39 C.R. (3d) 367,26 M.V.R. 279 (Ont. C.A.),
a case involving criminal negligence causing death due to an automobile accident, the Ontario
Court of Appeal held that proof of advertence as to the possible consequences was not
necessary, that "indifference" as to the consequences would suffice. In R. v. Waite (1986), 28
C.C.C. (3d) 326, 52 C.R. (3d) 355, 41 M.V.R. 119 (Ont. C.A.), also involving criminal
negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle causing death, the Ontario Court of Appeal held
that the Crown need not prove subjective intent in the sense of a deliberate assumption of risk
in the case of an act of commission; that a marked and substantial departure from the conduct
that could be expected of a reasonable person would suffice.
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of Canada cases'63 involving driving offences the Court appeared to
approve of instructions to the jury which might suggest an objective test
of culpability. 164 However, the recent decisions of the Supreme Court of
Canada in R. v. Waite65 and R. v. Tutton,166 despite a division of opinion
in both cases, strongly suggest that the view of the majority of the
Supreme Court is that a conviction for criminal negligence does require
proof by the Crown of the accused's advertence or awareness of the risk
that the prohibited consequences will come to pass167 or, alternatively, the
accused's wilful blindness to that threat which is culpable in light of the
gravity of the risk that is prohibited.'68 Furthermore, the decisions of
Wilson J., with Dickson C.J.C. and LaForest J. concurring in the result in
both cases, suggest that the same test of subjective intent in the form of
advertent negligence applies to both acts of commission and acts of
ormission. The decisions also establish that "a deliberate and wilful
assumption of risk" need notbe shown in order to establish the subjective
mens rea required for criminal negligence. 169
In many cases in which society might wish to attach blame either to the
church or church organization concerned, or to a church official, or to
both, a church official will have received a report of an incident of clergy
paedophilia and will have failed to report the information or suspicion to
appropriate government authorities. At the same time the church official
will have taken no action to prevent a continuation of the reported abuse,
or will have moved the alleged abuser to a new post or position involving
contact with young people, without warning anyone of the fact that the
person is a known or suspected paedophile. In such circumstances it
should not be too difficult to establish that the responsible church official
was either aware of the risk that further abuse would occur, or that he or
she demonstrated a wilful blindness to that threat. This is especially so in
163. See, for instance, the judgment of Cartwright J. in Binus v. The Queen, supra, note 159,
at 230 C.C.C., 121 C.R.N.S.
164. For helpful discussions of the mens rea in criminal negligence cases see E. Fruchtman,
"Recklessness and The Limits of Mens Rea: Beyond Orthodox Subjectivism: Part I,
(1986-87), 29 Crim L.Q. 315; M. Eisen, "Recklessness", (1988-89), 31 Crim L.Q. 347;
Comment, Alan D. Gold, "Criminal negligence -Elements of offence" (1986-87), 29 Crim
L.Q. 12; and Comment, Alan D. Gold, "Criminal law - Criminal negligence" (1988-89), 31
Crim L.Q. 405.
165. (1985), 48 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.).
166. (1989), 48 C.C.C. (3d) 129 (S.C.C.).
167. PerWilson J. (Dickson C.J.C. and La Forest J. concurring) in Tutton, supra, note 166,
at 12.
168. Ibid., at 13.
169. Waite, supra, note 165, at 2.
Paedophilia: The Criminal Responsibility of Canada's Churches
light of the publicity which sexual abuse scandals involving the clergy
have received in Canada in the past few years, and the increased
awareness of the public generally about the nature of paedophilia and
about the seriousness of the harm done to the victims of paedophilia.
It should be noted that according to the definition of criminal negligence
in s. 219 of the Criminal Code the offence may be committed by either
the doing of an act or by the omission to do an act which the accused has
a duty to do. Subsection 219(2) provides that "for the purposes of this
section, 'duty' means a duty imposed by law." The words "a duty
imposed by law" in s. 219 of the Code have been interpreted as including
a duty arising by virtue of statute or common law. 170
It may be beneficial to be able to show that it was a positive act of the
church official which resulted in the abuse of a victim, since the Crown
would not have to show that the church official breached a duty imposed
by law. In some cases, a church official, with knowledge of a cleric's
abusive tendencies, may remove the cleric to a new position involving
contact with children, without warning anyone of the cleric's paedophilia.
In such a case, if the removal of the cleric is followed by subsequent
abusive conduct, the Crown should be able to establish the charge of
criminal negligence on the basis of a positive act - removal with
knowledge.
However, in many instances in which the conduct of the church official
will be worthy of blame, it will involve a knowledge or suspicion of
previous abuse and a failure to report such abuse to proper government
authorities. It will, therefore, likely involve a breach of the statutory
reporting requirements discussed in the introduction to this article. 171
These statutory reporting requirements could form the basis of the "duty
imposed by law" where the behaviour consists of omissions only.
The provincial statutes, such as the Ontario Child and Family Services
Act'72 and the Nova Scotia Children and Family Services Act, 73 impose
the duty to report on every "person". The word person is not defined in
the statutes, but provincial interpretation statutes, such as theInterpretation
Act 74of Ontario, make it clear that the word "person" includes a
corporation. Thus the reporting requirements would apply to an
incorporated church or church organization. Furthermore, as mentioned
170. B. v. Coyne (1985), 124 C.C.C. 176,31 C.R. 335 (N.B.S.C. App. Div.); R. v. Popen (1981),
60 C.C.C. (2d) 232 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Thornton (1991), 1 O.R. (3d) 480 (Ont. C.A.).
171. See notes 16-28 and the accompanying text.
172. Supra, note 16, s. 72(1).
173. Supra, note 20, s. 25.
174. R.S.O. 1990, c. I-11, s. 29.
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in the discussion of these statutes in the introduction, the reporting
requirements in most of these statutes can be construed as requiring the
reporting of abuse of the child not only by a parent or guardian, but also
by others in temporary charge or control of the child. Thus they might
require reporting of abuse of a child by apriest or other cleric in temporary
charge or control of the child. They would almost certainly apply where
the abuse takes place within a church-run institution, such as an orphanage,
boarding school, or reform school, in which the abused child resides, and
where the abuse is by one of the caretakers within the institution.
As well, in situations of continued abuse of a child resident within a
church-run institution, where the abuse has been reported to a responsible
official within the institution and that official has failed to take the steps
necessary to protect the child from further abuse, both the official and the
institution might be seen as having breached a statutory duty to provide
necessaries of life to the child. Section 215(l)(a) of the Criminal Code
imposes on the guardians of a child the duty to provide necessaries for a
child under the age of sixteen years. Section 214 of the Code defines
guardian for the purpose of s. 215 of the Code as "a person who has in law
or in fact the custody or control of a child." Section 215(l)(c) imposes the
same duty to provide necessaries of life on a person who has another
person under his or her charge, where the other person, by reason of age
or other cause, is unable to withdraw himself or herself from that charge.
The concept "necessaries of life" has been construed as meaning such
necessaries as tend to preserve life and as not being limited to necessaries
in their ordinary legal sense. 75 Thus they have been interpreted as
including medical aid,176 and might also be interpreted to include the
protection of a child from harm. The failure of a responsible church
official to protect a child resident within an institution from further abuse
might therefore be seen as the breach, by the official and by the institution,
of the s. 215(1) duty to provide necessaries of life to the child under their
charge or guardianship. Such a breach of the statutory duty to provide
necessaries could form the basis of a prosecution for criminal negligence
based on an omission.
Furthermore, in such cases it might also be possible to show that the
institution and responsible church official had breached a common law
duty imposed upon it and upon him or her as temporary legal guardians
of the victim. The duty breached in such a situation would be the common
175. R. v. Brooks (1902), 5 C.C.C. 372 (B.C.S.C.).
176. Ibid.; R. v. Lewis (1903), 7 C.C.C. 261,6 O.R.L. 132; R. v. Cyrenne, Cyrenne and Cramb
(1981), 62 C.C.C. (2d) 238 (Ont. Dist. Ct.); and R. v. Tutton, supra, note 166.
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law duty of the institution and official as guardians of the child to take
reasonable steps to protect the youth from illegal violence by an agent or
employee of the institution. Such a duty might be imposed at common
law based on an analogy between the position of the church official in
charge of an orphanage or school and a parent. In R. v. Popen'" the
Ontario Court of Appeal held that a parent is under a legal duty at
common law to take reasonable steps to protect his child from illegal
violence used by the other parent towards the child which the parent
foresees or ought to foresee. In Popen it was held that such parent is
criminally liable for failing to discharge that duty in circumstances which
show a wanton or reckless disregard for the child's safety, where the
failure to discharge the legal duty has contributed to the death of the child*
or resulted in bodily harm to the child. The same reasoning would seem
to apply by analogy to the church official in charge of an institution in
which the youth was living at the time the abuse occurred. In such a case
the common law duty would form the basis of the "duty imposed by law"
which must be established to found a conviction based on an omission.
Section 219 of the Criminal Code does not itself create an offence, but
where criminal negligence as defined in s. 219(1) results in death or
bodily harm, it may be punishable as an offence under s. 220 or s. 221,
respectively. In the case of sexual abuse by members of the clergy the
relevant offence is that of causing bodily harm by criminal negligence
embodied in s. 221 of the Code. The Crown must show a causal
connection or nexus between the negligence of the accused and the
bodily harm suffered by the victim. In cases where a responsible church
official knew of the abuse and failed to act in order to prevent further
abuse, or has moved a known or suspected abuser into a position
involving contact with youth and further abuse has occurred, it should be
possible to establish that the negligence caused or contributed to the harm
suffered by the victim.
"Bodily harm" is not defined for the purposes of s. 221, but the
definition of "bodily harm" in s. 267(2) of the Code, which is applicable
to ss. 267, 269 and 272, replicates the meaning of that term at common
law. S. 267(2) provides:
(2) For the purposes of this section and sections 269 and 272, "bodily
har" means any hurt or injury to the complainant that interferes with the
health or comfort of the complainant and that is more than merely transient
or trifling in nature.
177. R. v. Popen, supra, note 170.
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The fact that the harm done to victims of paedophilia is neither transient
nor trifling in nature is well documented. 178 However, the long term
effects of sexual abuse for the victim usually relate to their emotional and
mental health rather than to physical injury. Unless the concept of bodily
harm is broadly interpreted to include injury to the emotional or mental
health of the victim, the requirement that the Crown prove "bodily harm"
to the victim would appear to reduce the potential usefulness of criminal
negligence causing bodily harm to condemn immoral and anti-social
behaviour of church officials who ignore reports of abuse in order to
protect their church or their colleagues.
The case law relating to "bodily harm" does suggest that the Crown
must establish physical injury as opposed to emotional or mental harm.
In R. v. Dupperon 179 the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal held that where
the evidence failed to show whether the bruising caused by the accused's
acts was more than merely transient or trifling in nature, the element of
"bodily harm" as defined in subsection 267(2) was not made out.
However, in R. v. Dixon ' 80Esson J.A. speaking for the Court of Appeal
of the Yukon made it clear that the words "transient or trifling in nature"
import a very short period of time and an injury of a very minor degree
of distress. Accordingly, while the Crown must establish physical harm,
that harm need by no means be long term.
Nevertheless, it appears from these cases concerning the meaning of
bodily harm that a charge of criminal negligence causing bodily harm will
be of potential use against churches and church officials only where the
further acts of abuse caused by the criminal negligence are accompanied
by violence causing physical injury. In this respectit is worth noting that
82 of the 182 charges laid by the Ontario Provincial Police in connection
with the sexual abuse scandal at the Catholic reform schools in Ontario
were charges of assault causing bodily harm."' The fact that instances of
sexual abuse by the clergy have often been accompanied by acts of
physical violence suggests that there is still considerable scope for the use
of criminal negligence causing bodily harm against churches and church
organizations.
178. See for instance, J. J. Huagaard and N. D. Reppucci, The SexualAbuse of Children (San
Francisco, California: Jossey Bass Inc., 1988), at 60-100; B.F. State and H. Alexander,
"Long-Term Effects of Sexual Abuse in Childhood", in P.B. Mrazek and C.H. Kempe, eds.
Sexually Abused Children and their Families,(Oxford, England: Pergamon Press, 1987), at
223-234; and D.Tinkelhor and A. Browne, "Assessing the Long-Term Impact of Child Sexual
Abuse: A Review and Conceptualization", in L.E.A. Walker, ed., Handbook on SexualAbuse
of Children, (New York: Springer Publishing Company, Inc., 1988), at 55-71.
179. (198_4), 16 C.C.C. (3d) 453,43 C.R. (3d) 70, [1985] 2 W.W.R. 369 (Sask. C.A.).
180. (1988), 42 C.C.C. (3d) 318, 64 C.R. (3d) 372, [1988] 5 W.W.R. 577 (Yukon Terr. C.A.).
181. See note 7 and accompanying text.
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2. Abandoning or Exposing a Child Under Ten Years of Age:
Section 218
Another Criminal Code offence which might be used against churches
and church organizations is the offence of abandoning or exposing a
child. This offence is embodied in s. 218 of the Code which provides as
follows:
s. 218. Everyone who unlawfully abandons or exposes a child who is
under the age of ten years, so that its life is or is likely to be endangered
or its health is or is likely to be permanently injured, is guilty of an
indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding
two years.
The words "abandon" and "expose" are defined in s. 214 of the Code
which provides:
s. 214. In this Part "abandon" or "expose" includes
(a) a wilful omission to take charge of a child by a person who is under
a legal duty to do so, and
(b) dealing with a child in a manner that is likely to leave that child
exposed to risk without protection.
In the case law, the word "abandoned" has been interpreted as meaning
"leaving the child to its fate".'8 2 The word "wilful", as used in this
section, has been interpreted as meaning "by deliberate or purposeful
conduct; with full knowledge of, or reckless of or indifferent to the
consequences of his act or omission; a callous disregard; a complete and
utter disregard for the safety of children".'83
The word "unlawfully", as used in s. 218, is not defined anywhere in
the Code. However, the meaning of the word "unlawful" as used in
statutes creating crimes, misdemeanours and minor offences was
considered by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Robinson.'84 In that
case it was held that the word unlawful has various significations, that it
does not necessarily mean "contrary to law", that it may mean "contrary
to moral standards or spiritual principles", "not authorized by law" or
"contrary to some prohibition of positive law."' 85 In the context of s. 218
the word "unlawfully", which qualifies the words "abandons or exposes",
appears to signify an abandonment or exposure of a child by someone
who is under a legal duty to care for the child. Since the concept of "a
wilful omission to take charge of a child by a person who is under a legal
182. R. v. Boulden (1957), 41 Cr. App. R. 105, at 110.
183. R. v. Reedy (No. 2)(1981), 60 C.C.C. (2d) 104 (Ont. Dist. Judges Crim. Ct. of Algoma),
at 106.
184. [1948] O.R. 857 (Ont. C.A.).
185. Ibid., at 859-860.
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duty to do so" is already part of the definition of "abandon" or "expose"
by virtue of s. 214, the word "unlawfully" appears to add little to the
definition of the offence embodied in s. 218.
In order for s. 218 to apply, the child who is abandoned or exposed
must be under the age of ten years. Furthermore, its "life" or "health"
must be endangered. The word "health" is not defined in the Criminal
Code and the case law is not helpful. In the absence of a clear definition
in the statute, it is for the courts, in interpreting the provision, to say what
the word means. The courts will, unless some other meaning is indicated
by the context, give the word its ordinary orplain meaning.1 16 It is perhaps
worth noting that Black's Law Dictionary defines "health" as the "State
of being hale, sound, or whole in body, mind or soul; well being."'8 7
According to this definition, the concept of injury to health embodied in
s. 218 appears to be broader than the concept of "bodily harm" contained
in s. 221 of the Code, in so far as it would include injury to mental and
emotional health and not just physical harm.
A conviction under s. 218 does not require proof of actual permanent
injury to the health of the child, but only proof of an abandonment or
exposure which was likely to cause permanent injuries to the child's
health or to endanger its life. Thus the offence was held to have been
made out where an accused abandoned her child in a motor vehicle for
an indefinite period of time in an environment which posed a threat to its
life due to the cold temperatures and risk of abduction. 88
An orphanage, reform school or boarding school run by a church or
church organization, and the head of such an institution, would appear to
be "persons" who are under a legal duty to take charge of a child who is
a resident in the institution.18 9 Where the head of such an institution has
knowledge or receives reports of sexual or physical abuse of such a child
under ten years of age, and fails to take any action to stop the abuse, the
institution of which he or she is in charge, and the official himself or
herself, clearly abandon or expose the child. Furthermore, in light of the
literature confirming the harmful and long term effects of sexual and
186. Victoria (City) v. Bishop of Vancouver Island, [1921] A.C. 384, at 387.
187. Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed.)(St. Paul, Minn: West Publishing Co., 1990), at 721.
188. R. v. Holder (1988), 63 C.R. (3d) 301 (Alta. Q.B.).
189. The institution and the officialin charge would appear to be underthe same duty as aparent
to care forthe child. See,forinstance,R. v.Reedy (No. 2)(1981), 60C.C.C. (2d) 104(Ont. C.A.)
in which it was held that a babysitter who had undertaken to look after and care for children
in the parents' absence was under a legal duty toward their children to take the same care of
the children as their parents are at law required to.
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physical abuse on the mental and emotional health of the abused child,19
it could almost certainly be established that such an abandonment or
exposure is one which permanently injures or is likely to permanently
injure the health of the child.
3. The Duty To Provide Necessaries of Life: Section 215
Yet another provision of the Code with potential application to churches
and church organizations in the circumstances which are the focus of this
article is s. 215, which creates the offence of failing to provide necessaries
of life. S. 215 provides as follows:
215. (1) Every one is under a legal duty
(a) as a parent, foster parent, guardian or head of a family, to provide
necessaries of life for a child under the age of sixteen years;
(b) as a married person, to provide necessaries of life to his spouse; and
(c) to provide necessaries of life to a person under his charge if that
person
(i) is unable, by reason of detention, age, illness, insanity or other
cause, to withdraw himself from that charge, and
(ii) is unable to provide himself with necessaries of life.
(2) Every one commits an offence who, being under a legal duty within
the meaning of subsection (1), fails without lawful excuse, the proof of
which lies upon him, to perform that duty, if
(a) with respect to a duty imposed by paragraph (1)(a) or (b),
(i) the person to whom the duty is owed is in destitute or necessitous
circumstances, or
(ii) the failure to perform the duty endangers the life of the person
to whom the duty is owed, or causes or is likely to cause the health of that
person to be endangered permanently; or
(b) with respect to duty imposed by paragraph (1)(c), the failure to perform
the duty endangers the life of the person to whom the duty is owed or causes
or is likely to cause the health of that person to be injured permanently.
As in the case of s. 218, s. 215 of the Code is most likely to have
application to a church-run institution such as an orphanage, reform
school or boarding school, or to the church official who acts as the head
of such an institution. Such an institution and official would almost
certainly be regarded as persons who, according to s. 215, are under a
legal duty to provide the necessaries of life to children under 16 years of
age who are resident in the institution. The duty to provide necessaries for
children within the institution might be based either on the status of the
institution and official as the temporary legal guardians of such children
(s. 215 (1)(a) of the Code), or on the fact that the children are under the
190. Supra, note 178.
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charge of the institution and of the church official and are, by reason of
their age, unable to withdraw themselves from that charge (s. 215 (1)(c)).
The offence of failure to provide necessaries is one which involves an
intentional omission to do what the law requires to be done and is
therefore a mens rea offence. 191 The essential elements of the offence are
first, proof of a legal duty to provide the necessaries of life as discussed
above. The words "necessaries of life" have been interpreted broadly to
mean such necessities as tend to preserve life, and might be interpreted
as including protection of the child from physical and/or sexual abuse. 192
Secondly, the failure must be to a person in destitute or necessitous
circumstances or, in the alternative, the failure must endanger the life of
the person to whom the duty is owed, or cause the health of that person
to be permanently endangered. 193
There have been no reported cases in which the words the "necessaries
of life", as used in s. 215(1) of the Code, have been interpreted to include
"protection of a child from harm". However, there is no reason why the
words could not be so interpreted in circumstances where it could be
proven that the guardian, or person under whose charge a child had been
placed, knew or suspected that the child had been subjected to sexual or
physical abuse by another individual also under his or her supervision and
control. Where, for instance, a church official acting as the head of an
institution in which children reside receives reports of sexual and physical
abuse of a child at the hands of someone under the official's supervision
and control, but fails to take reasonable steps to protect the child from
further harm, the institution and the official might be seen as breaching
the s. 215(1) duty to provide necessaries of life to the child. Furthermore,
as suggested in the foregoing discussion of s. 218 of the Code, such a
failure might legitimately be regarded as permanently endangering the
health of the child, given the long term effects of sexual abuse on the
emotional and mental health of the victim.
There may, of course, be other provisions of the Criminal Code with
potential application to churches and church organizations in the
circumstances contemplated by this article. The foregoing is not intended
to be an exhaustive discussion of all potentially relevant Criminal Code
offences. I have discussed only those three offences, the substance of
which seems most closely related to the primary objective which I hope
191. R. v. Degg (1981), 58 C.C.C. (2d) 387.
192. Supra, notes 178 and 176.
193. Supra, note 191.
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will be served by the imposition of criminal liability on churches in
connection with instances of clergy paedophilia - that is, the deterrence
of further irresponsible behaviour in order to protect children from the
harmful and long term effects of sexual abuse.
VII. Conclusion
In advocating the potential application of ss. 219, 221,215 and 218 of the
Code to the acts of church officials who act irresponsibly when faced with
reports of clergy paedophilia, this article is undoubtedly attempting to
push the existing law beyond its present bounds. One of the main
obstacles to using criminal law in the manner and for the purposes
suggested in this article is the natural reluctance many of us may have to
condemning as criminal the behaviour of churches and church
organizations, which, though obviously the source of some injurious
conduct, are also the source of many charitable good works which benefit
the weakest and most needy members of our society. The arguments
presented in this article in favour of the imposition of corporate criminal
responsibility upon Canada's churches and church organizations are not
written from an anti-church perspective or out of any hatred of or distaste
for, institutionalized religion. Nor are the arguments presented here
intended as a mere indulgence in academic theorizing.
The arguments contained in this article have been developed in
response to a genuine concern that the irresponsible acts and omissions
of church officials, who could have taken reasonable steps to prevent
further acts of clergy paedophilia when confronted with reports of abuse,
have instead, in many instances, contributed to the continuation of such
abuse. The arguments presented herein are based on the belief that this
irresponsible behaviour results, at least in part, from a misplaced
institutional loyalty which sacrifices the well-being of the victims to
serve the greater interests of the institutional church or church organization
concerned. As well, it appears that in some instances the irresponsible
behaviour of church officials has resulted, in part, from flaws in the
formal and informal authority structures of the churches concerned, from
defects in their administrative and management structures, and from a
lack of clearly developed policies and procedures for responding to
complaints of sexual abuse.
This article has attempted to highlight the similarities between churches
and business corporations as types of corporate organizations, and to
show that much of the harmful conduct of such organizations is due to
their common institutional characteristics - their structural defects and
the phenomena of institutional loyalty. As a result this article urges that
their delicts should be seen and treated as organizational phenomena. The
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imposition of enterprise or corporate liability on churches and church
organizations is advocated with a view to forcing them to improve their
internal organizational structures, decision-making processes, and
operating policies and procedures. The imposition of liability on churches
as corporate entities should serve as a catalyst which will cause the
churches concerned to better police their own agents and employees and
exert pressure on them to produce better behaviour in the future.
The imposition of criminal responsibility, rather than mere civil
liability, on Canada's churches, is advocated as the most effective means
of deterring future acts of clergy paedophilia. This argument is based on
a recognition of the primacy of the non-financial motivation and goals of
churches and church organizations. The moral condemnation inherent in
a criminal conviction is the antipathy of the raison d'&tre of such
organizations.
The article recognizes that in some circumstances it may be more
effective to punish those individuals within the church who are guilty of
wrongdoing than to punish the church itself. This is particularly so where
the motive behind the irresponsible behaviour was self-interest rather
than institutional loyalty, and where the continued abuse was attributable
to the behaviour of one or more individuals who are truly blameworthy,
rather than to the collective failure of many church officials and agents or
to institutional shortcomings. Thus in advocating corporate criminal
responsibility of Canada's churches in connection with acts of clergy
paedophilia, the article does not exclude the possibility of prosecuting
individuals wrongdoers. The determination of the appropriateness of
imposing criminal responsibility on the church itself will depend upon an
examination of the facts of each case and of the decision-making
processes of the church concerned.
It is hoped that the ultimate impact of imposing criminal liability will
be to deter future instances of clergy paedophilia, by improving the
behaviour of churches as corporate actors and the behaviour of individuals
within the corporate organization. Improving the behaviour of churches
as corporate actors in relation to the problem of clergy paedophilia will
require the churches themselves to examine their own organizational and
administrative structures, their decision-making processes, and policies
and procedures, with aview to discovering those institutional shortcomings
which give rise to irresponsible behaviour and result in further abuse of
children.
More specifically, churches may have to examine their ministry
formation programs in order to identify and treat those individuals with
paedophiliac tendencies. Such action will benefit potential victims,
potential abusers and the churches themselves. A similar attempt should
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be made to identify members of the clergy who have completed the
ministry formation stage and who are suspected of having paedophiliac
tendencies.
Furthermore, .churches must clarify their own moral teachings
concerning acceptable and unacceptable sexual conduct and strictly
enforce these teachings through well-developed internal disciplinary
procedures. Churches may also have to alter or improve their internal
organizational structures in order to improve the accountability of the
institutions to their members and the lines of communication between the
institutions and their members.
All churches and church organizations must initiate procedures in
order to respond compassionately, quickly and effectively to reports or
allegations of child abuse. Such procedures would include the distribution
of copies of provincial statutory child abuse reporting requirements to all
members of the clergy and to all employees of churches and church
organizations who might be caught by such reporting requirements. The
same individuals should be provided with educational programs
concerning the nature of paedophilia and the nature and effects of abuse.
Procedures should also be established for the speedy notification of the
proper authorities whenever an instance of child abuse is discovered..
Procedures and programs should be established by all churches and
church organizations to provide counselling and treatment both for the
alleged abuser and the purported victim. Churches might also consider
establishing funds for the purpose of compensating the victims of clergy
paedophilia.
Perhaps Canada's churches and church organizations will respond to
recent reports of sexual abuse of children by members of the clergy by
taking such measures without the need for the dramatic action advocated
in this article. They have not done so in the past. The appointment of the
Winter Commission to explore the issue of clergy paedophilia in the
Archdiocese of St. John's was clearly a step in the right direction.
However, should Canada's churches fall to respond adequately to the
sense of crises which many Canadians feel, as aresult of the recent reports
of sexual abuse scandals plaguing Canada's churches, then criminal
prosecution of churches and church organizations should be seriously
considered. The purpose to be served by such prosecution is deterrence
and rehabilitation, not retribution. Accordingly, should prosecution of
Canada's churches become necessary to force them to initiate the internal
changes required to reduce instances of clergy paedophilia, it would be
preferable if Canada's Criminal Code could be amended to provide for
new sanctions which would be potentially more effective than fines to
achieve the deterrent and rehabilitation goals advocated in this article.
